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Free Trade Agreements and the
Consolidation of Democracy†
By Xuepeng Liu and Emanuel Ornelas*
We study the relationship between participation in free trade agreements (FTAs) and the sustainability of democracy. Our model shows
that FTAs can critically reduce the incentive of authoritarian groups
to seek power by destroying protectionist rents, thus making democracies last longer. This gives governments in unstable democracies
an extra motive to form FTAs. Hence, greater democratic instability
induces governments to boost their FTA commitments. In a dataset with 116 countries over 1960–2007, we find robust support for
these predictions. They help to rationalize the rapid simultaneous
growth of regionalism and of worldwide democratization since the
late 1980s. (JEL D72, F13, F15, O19, O24)
“Striking down trade barriers is critical to sustaining democracy […]
throughout the region.”

W

— Former US President George W. Bush at the 2001 summit of the
potential signatories of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(New York Times, 4/18/2001)

hen the United States formally announced the intention to pursue a free trade
agreement with Central American countries, one explicit goal was “to support democracy” in the region (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/01/20020116-11.html). Indeed, the establishment of new democracies
has often been followed by the formation of preferential arrangements (or the accession to existing ones). This was the case, for example, of all Mercosur members, of
Greece, Portugal, and Spain in their accessions to the European Community, and of
the European Union (EU) agreements with Central and Eastern Europe countries
shortly after the fall of the iron curtain. It is therefore not too surprising that governments regularly report to the World Trade Organization that “promoting democracy
and political stability” is a central force behind their decisions to form regional trade

* Liu: Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain Rd, Kennesaw, GA 30144 (e-mail: xliu6@kennesaw.edu);
Ornelas: London School of Economics and Sao Paulo School of Economics-FGV, Houghton Street, London,
WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom (e-mail: e.a.ornelas@lse.ac.uk). We thank Facundo Albornoz, Pol Antràs, Paulo
Arvate, Scott Baier, Richard Baldwin, Jordi Blanes-i-Vidal, Kishore Gawande, Stephen Knack, James Lake,
Giovanni Maggi, Edward Mansfield, John McLaren, Giordano Mion, Stephen Nelson, Lorenzo Rotunno, Alan
Spearot, James Raymond Vreeland, Bob Staiger, Ben Zissimos, and seminar participants at several venues for useful comments and suggestions. We also thank Nathan Converse for excellent research assistance. Ornelas gratefully
acknowledges research support from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant RES-062-23-1360).
†
Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.6.2.29 to visit the article page for additional materials and author
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
29

30

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics

APRIL 2014

agreements (World Trade Organization 2011). Of course, this may be mere rhetoric.
But maybe not.
In this paper, we develop a coherent theoretical mechanism linking participation
in free trade agreements (FTAs) and democratic consolidation. We then scrutinize it
empirically. We argue that participation in FTAs can serve as a commitment device
to destroy future protectionist rents. Since such rents are attractive to autocratic
groups, FTAs lower their incentives to seek power. While this has little value in
established democracies, where the rule of law is strong and the authoritarian threat
is negligible, it matters for unstable democracies. Some states will therefore have an
extra incentive to seek involvement in FTAs, over and above the agreements’ possible trade gains.
We provide the theoretical basis for our claims by extending the preferential trade
integration model developed by Ornelas (2005a) to allow for endogenous changes
in the political regime.1 In that model, under any trade regime, domestic firms
exchange transfers for protection with the government. The government decides
whether to form an FTA considering the political economy equilibrium under each
trade regime. The key to understand the impact of an FTA is the recognition that
the equilibrium of the (ex post) external tariff game changes under the constraint
imposed by the agreement on the internal tariffs. Once one takes this into account,
and only then, one finds that even though FTAs still permit lobbying for protection
against excluded countries, the volume of protectionist rents falls with the formation
of an agreement.
In a dynamic setting this implies that, all else equal, groups motivated mainly by
rents will have lower incentives to seek power if the country is deeply engaged in
FTAs and withdrawal from the agreement is costly. Authoritarian groups tend to fit
this description well.2 If the gain of authoritarian groups from seeking power falls
when the country is engaged in FTAs, but the agreement does not alter the costs and
risks from attempting a coup d’état, the likelihood of democratic failure will, all else
being equal, be lower if the country is more intensively involved in FTAs. Hence,
greater participation in FTAs increases the likelihood of democracy survival.
If the incumbent government in an unstable democracy realizes this effect of
“democratic consolidation,” it will seek participation in FTAs more actively than it
otherwise would, in order to weaken the authoritarian threat. Yet even if the dictatorial group takes control despite the FTA, the agreement would still constrain its rentextraction activities. For both of these reasons, unstable democracies tend to enter
into FTAs more frequently than stable ones.
Analyzing the formation of FTAs and the strength of democracy in 116 countries over the period 1960–2007, we obtain empirical support for both of our main
theoretical results. Employing duration analysis techniques, we find that greater
1
To our knowledge, McLaren (2000) provides the only other theoretical analysis of how political turnover
affects governments’ decisions to participate in trade agreements. However, his emphasis is very different, on the
choice between free trade areas and customs unions.
2
In our analysis, we do not take a stance on whether democratic or authoritarian regimes are more rent-seeking.
We nevertheless note that, at least in the trade context, authoritarian regimes are more often associated with rent˘ lu 2002; and
creating policies (see e.g., Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000; Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubaşo g
Aidt and Gassebner 2010).
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p articipation in FTAs lowers the likelihood of democracy failure in a country. Using
the estimated hazard rates from the duration analysis, but considering only the portion of the likelihood that is not predicted by current FTA participation, we find
that a higher risk of democratic breakdown induces countries to participate more
actively in FTAs. Our empirical results are robust to many different econometric
specifications, alternative measures of democratic transition and different sets of
controls. They are also economically meaningful.
One of our empirical challenges is to define how unstable a democracy is. We
do so by relying on the approach proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2009), who
estimate the likelihood of democracy failure employing the concept of “democratic capital.” The domestic component of democratic capital reflects the history
of democracy in the country. The foreign component of democratic capital instead
encompasses current levels of democracy abroad. Along with other covariates,
these two components of democratic capital allow us to estimate the likelihood
of democracy failure in a country.
A concern is that FTA participation may be endogenous in the estimation of
democracy longevity. Indeed, our second hypothesis implies a positive relationship between democracy instability and formation of new FTAs. From this view,
the endogeneity bias would imply a positive relationship between FTA participation and democracy instability, suggesting that the negative relationship we
obtain is a lower bound (in absolute value) for the true effect. We nevertheless
propose an instrumental variable estimation that relies on “contagion” effects in
FTA formation that follows a reasoning advanced by Egger and Larch (2008) and
Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012). The main idea is that, when its neighbors engage
more deeply in FTAs, a country tends to follow suit. We confirm that contagion
measures are indeed strong instruments for FTA participation. Moreover, our
finding that more intense FTA participation increases the longevity of democracies is not altered when we use this approach.
Interestingly, our predictions hold consistently for full-fledged agreements
signed under the Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), but not for partial-scope preferential trade agreements signed under the
Enabling Clause of the GATT.3 These stark differential results are consistent with
the rent-destructing mechanism we put forward, as the partial-scope arrangements, unlike those signed under Article XXIV, impose very few restrictions on
the availability of rents from protection.4
To our knowledge, Pevehouse (2005) is the only other to relate participation in
trade agreements, as well as in other international organizations, to the durability
of democracy. He argues that, because of signaling effects, joining an international
organization increases the longevity of new democracies when the organization has
high “democratic density.” Following Pevehouse, we test whether the role of an FTA
in helping to sustain a country’s democracy is greater when the agreement is with

3

Article XXIV requires free trade agreements to cover most of the trade among the members and that members
liberalize fully vis-à-vis each other; the Enabling Clause permits numerous exceptions to those rules.
4
This relates to the findings of Mrázová, Vines, and Zissimos (2013), who show that Article XXIV can have
important welfare implications.
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more democratic partners. We find no such differential effects. Thus, pressure from
more democratic FTA partners is not what drives our results.
Our second finding is also novel, but relates to other previous results. Mansfield,
Milner and Rosendorff (2002) find that pairs of democratic countries are more likely
to share a trade agreement than pairs in which at least one country has an authoritarian political regime.5 We take Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff’s (2002) finding on board and focus on democracies. We then dig deeper to understand whether
democracies at different stages in their “consolidation” process have different incentives to engage in FTAs. We find that they do. Among democracies, those who face
threats to their democratic regimes are especially prone to form FTAs.
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) also distinguish between different types of
democracies and their willingness to join international organizations. They find that
countries that have undergone recent transitions to democracy are more likely to
join international organizations. Two central differences between the findings of
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) and our second main result are worth stressing.
First, we explicitly estimate each country’s hazard out of democracy. Second, we do
not pool all types of international organizations. This matters, as we find a strong
effect of democratic instability on FTA participation but not on participation in partial-scope trade agreements.
Our broader argument is related to the commitment rationale for trade agreements espoused by Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998, 2007), although in their
analyses a government enters a free trade agreement not to affect its successor’s
policies, but its own (otherwise time-inconsistent) future policies. The more general
idea that governments can manipulate state variables to constrain their successors’
choices was first advanced in the macroeconomics political economy literature.6
More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have developed a framework to
study circumstances when an incumbent democratic government can design policies
to irreversibly change the expected net benefit of future coups.7 A related reasoning
is employed here to show that a democratic government facing the prospect of political disruption may want to limit the ability of a potential authoritarian government
to create rents through trade policies. We innovate in this dimension by showing,
theoretically and empirically, that an FTA can be an effective tool for that purpose.8
There is also an important line of research that links democracy to trade liberalization and openness.9 The forces typically emphasized in that literature are,
5
Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse (2008) find that this holds for different types of trade agreements except the
“shallowest” ones, according to a five-tier classification. Roy (2011) takes a distinct perspective, showing that the
breadth of the service commitments undertaken by WTO members is greater for more democratic countries.
6
See e.g., the pioneering contributions by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989).
7
They demonstrate, for example, how trade and capital account liberalization reduce equilibrium taxation under
democracy, while also rendering coups more costly through the impact of openness on factor prices.
8
This contrasts with an alternative (and rather ubiquitous) view in the trade literature that regards FTAs as
rent-creating devices (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1995). See Freund and Ornelas (2010) for a discussion of that
literature.
9
See, for example, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), O’Rourke and Taylor (2007), López-Córdova and Meissner
(2008), and Stroup and Zissimos (2012). There is, of course, also a vast literature on the determinants of democracy and of its durability. See Barro (1999) for a classic reference for the former and Przeworski et al. (1996) for
the latter. Gassebner, Lamla and Vreeland (2013) provide empirical scrutiny of many factors that could affect the
survival of democracies.
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h owever, quite different from the mechanism we advance here. Moreover, we focus
on the role of trade agreements, where an external commitment makes the policy
costly enough to reverse so that it can credibly affect the actions of future governments.10 A unilateral tariff reduction would not fulfill this requirement.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we describe the model. In Section II
we analyze the incentives to form a free trade agreement. We discuss our empirical
strategy in Section III. The data are described in Section IV. We show our empirical
results in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
I. The Model

Our theoretical framework extends the model of Ornelas (2005a) to a simple
dynamic setting where an incumbent democratic government faces an authoritarian
threat. The basic structure of the model and its static results are therefore just like
those in Ornelas (2005a). We describe its structure and key results succinctly in
subsections IIA to IIC to keep the paper self-contained.
A. The Economic Structure
We consider a three-country, N-sector competitive economy where in each sector there is a “natural importer” country that would import the good from the other
two countries under free trade. Goods are produced under constant returns to scale.
One unit of the numéraire good 0 is produced with one unit of labor. All other goods
j = 1, … , N − 1 are produced with labor and a sector-specific factor. Thus, whenever good 0 is produced in equilibrium, which we assume to be the case, the wage
rate equals unity and general equilibrium forces are absorbed by that sector.
The analysis is conducted from the perspective of a “Home” country.
Home’s population consists of a continuum of agents with measure one. Each
agent is endowed with one unit of labor, whereas specific factors are owned
by a negligible fraction of the population. Consumers have quasi-linear utility
N−1
U = q0 + ∑  j = 1 [ Aqj − (qj  )2/2 ], which generates demand Dj = A − pjfor good j.
Home is the natural importer of goods m = 1, … , M, country Y is the natural
importer of a subset E of different goods, and country Z is the natural importer of
the remaining (N − M − E − 1) nonnuméraire products. Home’s owners of the
specific factor used in sector j earn π
 j( pj), where p j denotes the price of good j in
Home’s market. In the nonnuméraire sectors, the domestic supply of each imported
good m is S m( pm ) = dm pmand the supply of each exported good x is Sx( px) = dx p x,
where dx> dm> 0. An analogous specification applies for the supply and demand
structures of countries Y and Z. Home can use specific import tariffs in each import
sector; other policy instruments are assumed unavailable. We represent Home’s tariff on imports from country j by tj  , j = Y, Z. Because all import sectors are identical,
we will write prices and tariffs without sector-identifying superscripts.

10

See Bagwell and Staiger (2004, 2010) for a discussion of this and other roles of trade agreements.
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Prices for each product in the three countries are linked by arbitrage conditions.
Market-clearing and the arbitrary conditions link equilibrium prices to tariffs. When
Home is not a member of a free trade agreement, it follows GATT’s requirement of
nondiscrimination. When Home is in an FTA, imports from the FTA partner are duty
free, but imports from the excluded country remain taxed, although the country’s
optimal external tariff will in general change as a result of the FTA.
B. The Political Structure
We consider that any group represented in the government enjoys power because
there are rents for holding office, as in models like Besley and Coate’s (2001). The
sources of those rents are transfers/bribes, which the private sector offers to government officials in exchange for more favorable policies. Policymakers also care
about national welfare. Numerous reasons can explain this concern. Since modeling
the precise way in which policymakers form their preferences is not essential for
our analysis, we take an agnostic view, and simply assume that whoever is in power
sets policy, considering both its welfare consequences and its capacity to attract
transfers.
Let us define the measures of welfare. Welfare generated in a specific-factor import
sector is denoted by Wm(t), whereas Wxrepresents welfare from a specific-factor export
sector. The former is defined as the sum of consumers’ surplus, tariff revenue, and
producers’ surplus generated in that sector; the latter is defined as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus in the sector. Welfare aggregated across all nonnuméraire
 X≡ (N − M − 1)Wx,
import and export sectors is then W
 M(t) ≡ MW m(t) and W
respectively.11 National welfare, W(t), aggregates welfare across all sectors:
 	

M

N−1

m=1

x =M+1

W(t) ≡ 1 + WM(t) + WX = 1 + 
∑Wm(t) + ∑ Wx.

The preference of the government is specified as
(1)

M

N−1

m=1

x =M+1

G(t,T ) ≡  
∑Gm(t,Tm) +  ∑ Gx,

with G
 x  ≡ Wxand
 ) ≡ Wm(t) + bT  m
 ,
(1′ ) 	
Gm(t,T  m
where T  mdenotes the transfer from import-competing sector m to the government,
M
T ≡ ∑  m = 1 T  m, and b > 0 reflects the “rent-seeking bias” of the government, or
how susceptible to bribes/transfers its policies are.

11
Note that we denote welfare in import-competing sectors as a function of the tariff, but not in export sectors,
because W
 xdepends only on the tariffs imposed by foreign countries Y and Z. Since those tariffs are given from the
perspective of the Home government under any trade regime, we employ this more concise representation.
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The government sets policy according to (1) regardless of its nature, democratic or not. We adopt this assumption not because we believe that both types of
governments implement identical policies, but because our main results do not
depend on this distinction, and we have nothing to add to the (extensive) debate on
whether democracies or autocracies are more rent-seeking.12 We also abstract from
domestic political competition. Nevertheless, one can reinterpret the government’s
payoff as an expected payoff (taking into account the probability of being voted out
of power). Ultimately, what is essential is that the rents from holding office depend
on the policies implemented.
Because of the symmetry and independence across sectors, we focus on a single
import-competing sector. The net payoff of producers in such a sector corresponds
to the industry’s aggregate profits, πm(t), subtracted of the transfers it gives to the
local government, T  m.
As in Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998), we model the interaction between government and each domestic industry as a Nash bargaining game, where each side
obtains half of the total surplus from the negotiation process.13 Under the Nash
bargaining protocol, the outcome of the bargaining process is jointly efficient. Thus,
the “political tariff” resulting from this interaction satisfies
(2)	
t  p  = arg   max[Wm(t) + bπm(t)],
where the term in brackets represents (up to a constant) the joint payoff of the
government and the industry in a representative import-competing sector. We
concentrate on the case where the solution to problem (2) is interior. This corresponds
to assuming that b < bm
 ax  ≡ (1 + dm)(dx  − d m)/(1 + dx)dm.
C. Equilibrium Payoffs
If the private sector were able to capture the entire surplus from lobbying, it
would only need to compensate the government for the distortions that tpcreates. In
that case, the government would obtain its reservation payoff, which is equivalent
to how much it would get by setting tariffs to maximize national welfare, yielding a
 m(b = 0).
payoff from each import-competing sector of W
 m(tp(b = 0)), or simply W
m
m
This would require a transfer from each lobby of [W (b = 0) − W (b)]/b, where
Wm(b) ≡ Wm(tp(b)). Conversely, if the government could retain the whole surplus
from lobbying, producers from each import-competing industry m would earn
only their reservation payoff of πm(b = 0) ≡ πm(tp(b = 0)), entailing a transfer of
[πm(b) − πm(b = 0)] to the government. Since government and domestic industry
split the surplus from lobbying, the equilibrium transfer from each industry to the
Grossman and Helpman (1996) provide microfoundations for the weights in equation ( 1  ′    ), but in a model
of electoral competition, whereas our context is one where a potential autocrat considers taking over the country,
not through the ballot box but through force. Dixit (2010) provides a nuanced general discussion of rent-seeking
behavior in democracies and autocracies.
13
One may want to distinguish the bargaining power of the government relative to the domestic industries based
on whether it is democratic or autocratic, for example, because the forces limiting rent-seeking behavior may be
weaker in dictatorships due to less accountability. Since this has no bearing on our results, we take the simpler route
of assuming that government and private sector always split the surplus from lobbying.
12
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government is instead T  m
 = [πm(b) − πm(b = 0)]/2 + [Wm(b = 0) − Wm(b)]/2b.
Hence, in equilibrium the government obtains from each nonnuméraire importcompeting sector a payoff of
 (b)
(3) 
Gm = Wm(b) + bT  m

{

}

1 m
1
   [ π
  (b) − πm(b = 0) ]+  _ [ Wm(b = 0) − Wm(b) ]  .
= Wm(b) + b  _
2
2b

There is a more intuitive way of representing this expression. First, define the
“political rents” created in the lobbying process in each nonnuméraire import-
competing sector as
(4)

PRm  ≡ [ Wm(b) + bπm(b) ] − [ Wm(b = 0) + bπm(b = 0) ].

The expression in the first set of brackets of (4) is the maximized joint payoff of
the government and the industry, while the expression in the second set of brackets
is the value of the same function in the absence of lobbying. The difference between
them represents the surplus that the lobbying process adds to the joint payoff of government and industry. From (3) and (4) we can see that, in equilibrium, the government obtains its reservation payoff in the sector plus its share of the political rents:
PRm
 .
(5)	
Gm = Wm(b = 0) +  _
2
Aggregating across all sectors, we can write (1) evaluated at the equilibrium as
(6)

PR
 ,
G ≡ G(tp,T ) = WM(b = 0) + WX +  _
2

where PR ≡ ∑  m = 1PRm. Hence, the government obtains in equilibrium its
reservation utility, [WM(b = 0) + WX], plus its share of the political rents. This
makes clear that the group in power does not fully internalize the welfare distortions
due to its use of the political tariff.
In contrast, if the same political group were out of power, its payoff would be different even if the tariff were the same. The reason is that the group does not receive
any rents if it is not in a position to enact policies. Accordingly, in that case the group
would receive none of the available office rents, and its equilibrium payoff H would
reflect only the general state of the economy:
M

(7)

H ≡ G(tp,0) = WM(b) + WX.

The benefits from holding office correspond to the difference between (6) and
(7), which is positive because WM(b = 0) ≥ WM(b) and PR ≥ 0.
D. Coup Threat
We consider a simple 2-period environment. Agents discount future payoffs
according to discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. In the first period there is a democratically
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elected government in power. There is also a group of citizens that represent a segment of the population not in the government, which may attempt to take power
through force. There is an exogenous probability that they will have this opportunity. We are agnostic about the identity of the citizens represented by this group;
it could be the military, a group of capitalists, or the upper class, etc. In any case,
if a coup is attempted and is successful, the authoritarian group takes power in the
second period.
Naturally, numerous factors affect both the possibility of initiating a coup and its
probability of success. For example, both tend to be higher the stronger the “support” of the citizens who favor the coup and the weaker the “resistance” from the
segments of the population opposed to the coup.14 We do not model these probabilities, because quantifying those forces would be remarkably difficult. We highlight,
however, that they are likely to be strongly (negatively) affected by the country’s
stock of “democratic capital” (DC). The notion of democratic capital, introduced by
Persson and Tabellini (2009), proxies the strength of the country’s democratic institutions. Thus, it provides a useful and concise way of capturing several forces highlighted in the voluminous literature on the durability of democracies. Specifically,
in the definition of Persson and Tabellini, the current stock of DC in a country is
determined by both the level of democracy in the country’s neighbors and by the
country’s democratic history. They reason that in nations with enduring democratic
tradition, where the rule of law is strong, democratic capital will be abundant and
significantly limit the possibility of political disruption. Conversely, in countries
lacking solid institutions, where the rule of law is weak, democratic capital will be
scarce, thus opening a tangible opportunity for successful coups. Since the level of
democratic capital in a country can be considered exogenous (or at least predetermined) to the relevant political groups, we will rely on it in our empirical analysis.
We model the authoritarian group’s problem as simply as possible. We assume
that, if the takeover attempt is successful, the authoritarian group imposes an autocratic regime in the country and obtains its office payoff G in the second period. If
the takeover attempt is unsuccessful, the group bears a fixed cost K > 0.15 The probability of success of the coup is denoted by ρ.
Therefore, when a coup is attempted, the present value payoffs of the incumbent
and of the authoritarian group are represented, respectively, by
(8)	
ΓD = G + δ[(1 − ρ)G + ρH ],
(9)	
ΓA = H + δ[(1 − ρ)(H − K) + ρG ].
If no coup were attempted, the incumbent government and the authoritarian group
receive, respectively, G and H in each period.

See, for example, the insightful discussion by Brender and Drazen (2009) on how the effectiveness of policies
to consolidate democracies depends on the strength of the public support for the democratic regime.
15
Parameter K provides a proxy for the many kinds of penalties that could apply in such a case: incarceration,
extradition, death, and the like.
14
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Thus, the (risk-neutral) authoritarian group attempts to take power if and only if
the expected utility from the endeavor is positive: Γ
 A> (1 + δ )H. Using (9), this
condition is equivalent to
(10)

ρ(G − H) > (1 − ρ)K.

That is, provided that it can initiate a coup, the authoritarian group will attempt to
take power if its expected gain from seeking power is large relative to the expected
cost of a failed coup. To make explicit what is behind this decision, we use expressions (6) and (7) to rewrite condition (10) as
1 − ρ(DC)
PR
 >  _
   K.
[ WM(b = 0) − WM(b) ] +  _
(11)	
2
ρ(DC)

In a consolidated democracy, where democratic capital is very high, an attempt
against the county’s democratic system is unlikely, unless the costs of failure are too
low—which is rarely the case—or the gains from holding power are very significant. Our central goal is to analyze how a free trade agreement affects the latter, and
through that channel the endurance of democracy in a country.
Naturally, an FTA can be used to affect future policies only if its reversal is costly
enough to inhibit future governments from reversing the arrangement. While here
we simply assume that FTAs are irreversible, it would be relatively straightforward
to extend the current model so that irreversibility becomes an equilibrium result,
e.g., by relying on McLaren’s (2002) notion that governments incur in “negotiating costs” when forming (or withdrawing from) FTAs. Ultimately, FTAs matter for
commitment as long as there is a nontrivial cost to reverse them.16
It is also important to clarify that, although we consider a discrete-time problem,
one should think of this as a continuous-time problem, where the realization of a
coup depends on both exogenous (e.g., the state of the world economy) and endogenous (e.g., effort spent on coordination) factors. The point we develop below is
that the latter is affected by policies such as the formation of an FTA. We keep the
two-period modeling only for expositional reasons.
II. The Decision to Form a Free Trade Agreement

A free trade agreement between two countries is represented by the elimination
of tariffs on each other’s imports in all sectors included in the agreement. Thus, the
equilibrium under an FTA is analogous to the one described in Section II, the only
difference being the constraint imposed on some (potentially all) of the partners’
reciprocal import tariffs. Without loss of generality, we let Home’s potential FTA
partner be country Y.

16

Irreversibility is also coherent with history, as preferential trading arrangements de facto implemented are
seldom turned down later on. Even in the rather rare circumstances when authoritarian regimes gained control of
a country that participated in an effective trade agreement, the arrangement is usually honored, as, for example, in
Swaziland, a member of SACU.
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An FTA can be implemented by the incumbent government for reasons related or
unrelated to the authoritarian threat. There are four possibilities. First, the country
may already be a consolidated democracy, in the sense that condition (15) holds
neither with nor without FTAs. This is the standard case considered in the regionalism literature, and it is not our goal to analyze it further here. Rather, we focus on
situations where FTAs can be formed for “strategic” reasons.
The second possibility is that the country’s democracy is so fragile that condition (15)
is satisfied whether or not there is an FTA in place. In that case, while an FTA cannot
be used to prevent a coup, the possibility of losing power can affect the incentives of
the incumbent government with respect to the formation of the agreement. Finally, it is
possible that an FTA affects (in either direction) the expected payoff of the authoritarian group and, as a result, its incentives to attempt to take power.
Before starting our analysis, we need to describe the effects of an FTA on the
level of available political rents and the role of parameter b in shaping its welfare
effects. These results set the basis for the analysis of the political viability of FTAs.
A. The Rent Destruction Effect
Ornelas (2005a) shows that an FTA moderates the role of political economy
forces in the determination of tariffs, and that the mitigation of the politically driven
distortions corresponds to a source of welfare gain that is more relevant, the more
far-reaching the government’s political economy motivations. Furthermore, an FTA
diminishes the rents created in the lobbying process. Intuitively, because the arrangement provides free access to the partner’s exporters, the market share of the domestic industry shrinks, at any given external tariff. As a result, the FTA makes any price
increase brought by a marginal increase in the external tariff less valuable for the
import-competing industries, lowering their incentives to lobby for higher external
tariffs. In equilibrium, these lower incentives result in a lower external tariff and in
fewer rents for the government.17 The following lemma summarizes these effects.18
Lemma 1: [The rent destruction effect of FTAs (Ornelas 2005a)] Everything else
constant, an FTA:
(i) improves Home’s welfare by more (or reduces it by less), the higher the government’s rent-seeking bias; and
(ii) reduces the political rents generated in the political process.

There is robust empirical evidence that the formation of free trade areas in developing countries (largely the
focus of our analysis) leads to declining external tariffs (see Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas 2008 for evidence
from Latin America and Calvo-Pardo, Freund, and Ornelas 2011 for evidence from Southeast Asia), although the
evidence is mixed for developed countries (see Limão 2006 and Ketterer, Bernhofen, and Milner 2013). While
measuring protectionist rents directly is very difficult, the level of tariffs provides a good proxy for them; see Freund
and Ornelas (2010) for a general discussion.
18
These results do not hinge on the perfectly competitive structure adopted by Ornelas (2005a), which we follow here. Analogous results obtain also under oligopolistic competition (Ornelas 2005b).
17

40

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics

APRIL 2014

Lemma 1 allows us to analyze the conditions under which the Home government
would choose to form an FTA.19 The decision regarding the formation of an FTA is
based on the anticipated impact of the agreement. The government implements the
agreement if and only if it increases the government’s present value payoff. Note
that the effects described in Lemma 1 are larger, the greater the number of specificfactor import-competing sectors included in the FTA.
It is worth noting that, although we abstract from direct lobbying for and against
FTAs, adding ex ante lobbying would have little effect on the analysis, just as
Ornelas (2005a) shows to be the case when changes in the political regime are not
considered. Consider for example exporting sectors, the main source of support for
FTAs. Their benefits from an FTA depend primarily on the extent of the access to
the partners’ markets, rather than on domestic policies. Therefore, their willingness
to support an FTA is not directly affected by who holds power.
Before analyzing how the possibility of political disruption affects the government’s willingness to form free trade agreements, we define some useful notation.
We henceforth attach subscript “F ” to all variables when they are evaluated under
an FTA. We adopt subscript “ΔF ” to represent the equilibrium change in any variable due to the FTA. For example, W
   Δx Fdenotes the aggregate welfare change in a
nonnuméraire export sector due to the agreement, whereas W  mΔF( b) and W  mΔF( b = 0)
denote, respectively, the aggregate welfare impact of the FTA on a nonnuméraire
import sector and the equivalent effect under a hypothetical administration whose
only concern is national welfare (equivalent to a situation where lobbying is effectively banned). Finally, let IMdenote the number of s pecific-factor i mport-competing
sectors included in the FTA under analysis, with I M≤ M. Aggregating the welfare
IMW  mΔF( b)
impact of the agreement on both types of sectors, we then define W  M
Δ F (b) ≡ 
X
X x
M
m
and W
   ΔF≡ I W  ΔF. Analogously, PR  ΔF ≡ I PR  ΔF.
B. FTAs That Do Not Affect the Probability of Political Disruption
We begin analyzing the case where there is a possibility of political disruption but
this possibility is unaffected by the existence of FTAs—that is, condition (11) holds
regardless of FTAs.
In this case, the equilibrium payoff of the incumbent democratic government
under the FTA corresponds to
(12)	
Γ  DF   = GF  + δ[(1 − ρ)GF  + ρHF ].
The condition under which the democratic government supports the FTA when the
authoritarian threat is inevitable is Γ  DΔF ≡ Γ  DF   − ΓD   > 0. Using equations (8) and
(12), Γ  DΔFcan be rewritten as
  + δ[(1 − ρ)GΔF
  + ρHΔF
 ].
	
Γ  DΔF = GΔF
19
Naturally, an FTA is formed only if all prospective members endorse it. We conduct the discussion from the
perspective of the Home country, but an analogous analysis would apply for country Y.
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Using expressions (6) and (7) and manipulating, this expression becomes

[

]

PR  ΔF
_
(13) 
Γ  DΔF= [1 + δ(1 − ρ)]W  M
b) + (1 + δ )W  XΔF .
   + δρW  M
ΔF (b = 0) +  
ΔF(
2
Thus, the incumbent democratic government supports the FTA in this case if
(14) 
[ 1 + δ(1−ρ) ][ 2W  MΔF(b = 0) + PR  ΔF ]  + 2δρW  MΔF(b) + 2(1 + δ )W  XΔF> 0.
The interesting case is when the democratic government changes its stance
toward an FTA because of the authoritarian threat. An FTA is (ordinarily) politically feasible if
(15)

2
[ W  MΔF(b = 0) + W  XΔF ] + PR  ΔF  > 0.

The next proposition shows that the authoritarian threat can make an otherwise
politically infeasible FTA (i.e., one for which condition (15) does not hold) into a
politically feasible one. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1: Even if the authoritarian threat cannot be affected, the mere
possibility of political disruption can turn an otherwise politically unfeasible FTA
into a viable one. The set of parameters under which this happens increases with the
number of Home’s specific-factor import-competing sectors included in the agreement (IM). By contrast, the possibility of disruption cannot render unfeasible an
otherwise feasible FTA.
Proposition 1 shows that the possibility of political disruption can enhance the
political feasibility of FTAs by creating a “strategic” motivation for their adoption.
Strategically supported FTAs arise when, between conditions (14) and (15), only
the former is satisfied, so that
(16)	
Γ  DΔF(ρ = 0) ≤ 0 < Γ  DΔF(ρ > 0).
An FTA can be implemented for strategic reasons because the democratic government, if out of power, will not receive any of the lobbying-related rents. In that case,
the government would benefit from an FTA because the agreement constrains the
welfare-distorting political activities of the authoritarian group if it gets in power.
Thus, a government that expects to lose power to a dictatorial group might seek an
FTA simply to constrain the policies of the incoming authoritarian group. Since this
strategic motivation is more relevant when disruption is more likely, it follows that
“democratic instability” incites the formation of free trade agreements. 20
20
It is easy to see that this strategic motivation for signing FTAs is stronger, the greater the rent-seeking bias of
the autocrat. This follows because the forces underlined in Lemma 1 are stronger, the higher the rent-seeking bias of
the group setting policies. This suggests that an authoritarian threat can make strategic FTAs particularly appealing,
since despite some disagreement, the majority of views in the literature seem to agree that autocracies tend to pursue
particularly distortionary policies (see Dixit 2010).
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The strength of this strategic motivation to form an FTA depends on how comprehensive the agreement is. This is represented in the model by the number of Home’s
import-competing sectors susceptible to lobbying that are included in the FTA, IM.
Intuitively, if Home imports more widely from its FTA partner in sectors where
there is active lobbying, the agreement becomes more rent-destructing. While this
helps the country as a whole, it is detrimental to those in office who benefit from
those rents. Under the threat of political disruption, however, the government understands that the loss of rents will likely be borne by the authoritarian group. Hence
the destruction of rents becomes less critical in the democratic government’s evaluation of the agreement.
C. FTAs That Can Help Secure Democracies
The analysis above considers the case where a free trade agreement is not pivotal in the decision of the authoritarian group to attempt to take power through
force. This need not be the case. Specifically, an FTA can prevent a coup from
happening, although it cannot provoke a coup that would not occur without
the agreement.
Proposition 2: If the authoritarian group did not intend to initiate a coup
in the absence of trade agreements, an FTA cannot induce it to initiate one. On
the other hand, the formation of a sufficiently rent-destructing FTA can free the
country from the authoritarian threat. This is more likely to happen, the greater
the number of Home’s specific-factor import-competing sectors included in the
agreement (IM).
Proposition 2 shows that, because of the rent-destructing effects of FTAs,
a free trade agreement can critically reduce the incentives of the authoritarian group to subvert the country’s democratic system. In this sense, an FTA
helps to constrain the emergence of authoritarian regimes, especially if the
bloc is significantly rent-destructing. Relying on the common notion that the
availability of rents can entice political turbulence, the proposition’s novelty
stems from the recognition of FTAs as instruments to restrain the gains from
rent-seeking behavior.
Recall that Proposition 1 asserts that the possibility of political disruption can
render feasible an otherwise unfeasible free trade agreement, even if it had no effect
on the political regime. If the agreement also plays a role in preventing disruption of
the political system, the government’s incentives to sign the agreement are further
enhanced (even though here we abstract from any ideological motivation the incumbent democratic government may have). We show this formally in Proposition 3
in the Appendix.
Our results thus suggest that free trade agreements—especially those that are
particularly effective in destroying rents—can be useful to prevent an authoritarian threat. This can be especially important in fledgling democracies, given the
instability that typically follows the end of dictatorial regimes. We now turn to
showing that these relationships are empirically robust.
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III. Empirical Strategy

The model has two main predictions about the relationship between FTAs and
democracy, which imply the following hypotheses:
H1. Participation in FTAs lowers the probability of democratic failure.
H2. Unstable democracies are more likely to form FTAs.
To test H1, we define our dependent variable either as a dummy indicating whether
democracy was interrupted or as the length of democratic spells. This allows us to
estimate the probability that democracy will fail in the country, which we denote by
Pr(enddemo) or simply P. We define democracy failure in different ways, based on
either Polity IV data or on a dichotomous classification from Cheibub, Gandhi, and
Vreeland (2010); we explain this in detail in Section IV. The key independent variable is a measure of the intensity of the country’s participation in FTAs.
To test H2, our dependent variable is the change in a country’s FTA participation.
The key independent variable is a measure of democratic instability that reflects the
expectation that the democratic regime may fail in the country.
As indicated at the beginning of this paper, our problem is related to the one studied by Persson and Tabellini (2009), who examine the determinants (in particular
the effect of income) of the stability of democracies and the impact of this perceived
stability on income growth. Our empirical strategy resembles their approach.
A. Testing H1: Participation in FTAs and Democracy Survival
We estimate the likelihood of democratic failure relying on the concepts of
domestic democratic capital (DOM) and foreign democratic capital (FOR) developed by Persson and Tabellini (2009), while adding a variable that captures the
intensity of a country’s participation in FTAs. DOM is a measure of the democratic
history of the country, whereas FOR measures current levels of democracy in the
world.21 Other explanatory variables include economic factors (e.g. GDP per capita)
and geographical and institutional factors (e.g. war indicators, continent of location
and legal origin), denoted by vector Z.
Guided by our model, we consider only countries’ democratic spells. We estimate
a discrete time duration analysis modeled as logit, which we implement as follows:
(17)

log(Pit/(1 − Pit ))

 	  = 
α0  + α1FTAi, t−1  + α2   DOMi, t−1  + α3   FORi, t−1  + Zit β + eit  ,
where P
 it denotes Pr(enddemo) for country i in year t and β is a coefficient vector
for Zit  .22
21

In the next section, we provide a precise definition of both variables.
An alternative to this logit specification would be a complementary loglog (cloglog) regression, where we
treat the time interval as discrete or grouped by year. However, when the probability of positive outcomes is small
22
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The variable FTA in equation (17) represents the extent (or the “intensity”) of
a country’s participation in FTAs in a given year. Measuring the FTA intensity of
a country is far from trivial. Despite a prolific literature on the consequences of
preferential integration, that line of research offers no guidance on how to measure
this intensity. In fact, most empirical regionalism papers simply use dummies to
represent FTA participation. While this can be adequate for other purposes, such a
measure is inappropriate here. Unlike other studies, where the unit of observation is
a country dyad, we need a measure of FTA participation at the country level, since
we want to estimate the endurance of democracy in individual countries. And defining participation in FTAs as a binary decision would not represent FTA engagement
in a way that is even remotely related to what our model suggests. For example,
every WTO member except Mongolia participates in at least one FTA, so there
would not be any variation in such a measure in recent years. Using the analog of the
dyadic dummies for the monadic case, i.e., the count of FTAs a country belongs to,
would be similarly inadequate. The reason is the wide heterogeneity among FTAs.
Some arrangements are fully implemented, but others are not, implying that preferences actually offered are few and small, and therefore entail little destruction of
rents. Similarly, some agreements are very large (e.g., the EU), while others are
tiny, including some that have many members (e.g., CARICOM). Even within a
given FTA, the impact of the bloc can be very different on each member. Consider
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although it has had a large
impact on Mexico, the smallest member, its effects are much less pronounced in
the United States, the largest member. According to Proposition 2, only sufficiently
rent-destructing FTAs have an effect on the sustainability of democracy. We clearly
need, therefore, a more precise measure of the intensity of a country’s participation
in FTAs than what FTA dummies offer.
In our model, where all sectors are symmetric, the extent of rent destruction within
an FTA is given by the number of import-competing sectors included in the agreement.
More generally, it also depends on the size of the export sectors of the FTA members
relative to Home’s import-competing sectors. To capture both, we use, in our main
regressions, the share of imports from FTA members. We recognize that this variable
does not offer a precise measure of the extent to which FTAs destroy rents in each
country; identifying empirically those sectors in every country is virtually impossible.
However, the variable has the central virtue of varying monotonically with the degree
of implementation of the agreement and with the impact of the agreement on the country in question. Consequently, it should be positively correlated also with the variable
IM from our model, which represents the extent to which import-competing sectors
where lobbying happens are included in the agreement. Hence, the import share from
FTA members provides a useful proxy for the c ountry-level degree of rent destruction
engendered by the FTAs a country belongs to. Compared with the alternative methods
of measuring FTA participation used in the literature, which almost always rely on

as in our case, where democratic failures account for only 2.2 percent of the sample (see Table 1), a cloglog link
function is similar to a logistic link function. Since logistic regressions are more conventional than cloglog ones, we
focus on the former. Results from cloglog regressions are similar.
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dummy variables, our method is more appropriate for our goals, because it varies with
the extent and intensity of FTA.
Notice that our measure of FTA participation does not distinguish between trade
integration that is deep but involves only a few (natural or large) trading partners and
trade integration that is shallow but encompasses agreements with many partners.
According to our theory, the distinction is immaterial as long as both cases lead to
similar levels of rent destruction.23
We also need to take into account the possibility of duration dependence in (17),
i.e., the extent to which the conditional hazard of democracy rises or falls over time.
If there is duration dependence, the hazard of enddemo will depend on the duration
of the democratic regime. In general, its effect can be either positive or negative.
Domestic democratic capital will capture part of the duration dependence. For the
residual duration dependence, we use a polynomial of a time counter that counts
the number of years passed since the beginning of the current democratic spell. The
order of the polynomial is determined by the best fit in the regressions.24 Including
this duration polynomial, which we denote by DUR, we rewrite our estimating equation as
(18) log(Pit/(1 − Pit))
 	  = 
α0 + α1FTAi, t−1 + α2  DOMi, t−1 + α3  FORi, t−1 + α4  DUR + Zitβ + eit  .
A remaining concern in (18) is unobserved heterogeneity. It is possible that some
countries are more likely to have interrupted democracies due to unobserved variables that are correlated with some right-hand side variables in (18). To deal with
this possibility, we run a country random effects logit specification.25
Alternatively, we also use continuous time duration analysis for equation (18),
defining the dependent variable as the duration of a democracy spell, i.e., the
number of years passed since the onset of each democracy spell until it was interrupted or right-censored.26 This variable is the same as the time counter we use
for the duration dependence in the logit specifications. Hence the unit of analysis here is a democratic spell. The duration dependence is specified parametrically
(Weibull model) or nonparametrically (Cox proportional hazard model). In the
Weibull model, the hazard function is h(t) = φexp(β ′Xt)tφ−1, where φ is a shape
23
We nevertheless investigate the robustness of our empirical results to an alternative measure of FTA participation that varies when a new agreement is formed but not when the depth or the breadth of existing agreements
changes.
24
Using year dummies to account for duration dependence is not an appealing alternative for our analysis, since
all the years without a democratic failure would be dropped from the sample, causing the loss of important crosssectional variation.
25
Acemoglu et al. (2008) highlight the importance of including country fixed effects when studying the effect
of income on democracy. Unlike in that type of analysis, in our case a fixed effects logit procedure (i.e., conditional logit) would be inappropriate because most countries do not experience democracy failure during our sample
period. As a result, the observations for all long-lived regimes would be dropped, eliminating much of the crosssectional variation in the data that helps us to capture the effect of FTAs on democracy survival.
26
Since the Polity dataset can go as far back as 1800, we can determine the onset of the democratic spell even
for most countries that have a democratic regime in the beginning of our sample (1960). In the few instances when
this is not possible, we set the onset of the democratic spell to the first year for which 9 positive polity score is
available.
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p arameter to be e stimated and t is the duration time. In the Cox model, the hazard is
h(t) = h(0)exp(β ′Xt), where the baseline hazard, h(0), is allowed to be group-specific.
B. Testing H2: Democracy Instability and FTA Formation
Once we have the predicted Pr(enddemo), we can use it to test our second hypothesis, that the likelihood of democratic failure helps to explain the formation of FTAs.
In the analysis we also include the economic, geographical, and institutional variables used in the duration regression as controls, except DOM, FOR, and the duration dependence terms. Nothing in our theory suggests that these variables should
have an independent effect on the change of a country’s FTA participation, ΔFTA,
in addition to their indirect effects on ΔFTA through Pr(enddemo). This is analogous to the identification assumption of Persson and Tabellini (2009), that democratic capital affects income growth through their effects on the sustainability of
democracy only. We also exclude the duration dependence terms. Instead, we use
year dummies to capture time effects. In our context, the rationale to exclude FOR
may not apply, because the level of democracy in a region could have an independent effect on the likelihood that countries in the region will form FTAs. Thus,
for robustness we also run a specification where we include in the ΔFTA regression DOM, FOR, and the duration dependence terms. In that case, we rely only on
the nonlinearity of our regression to identify the parameters of interest. We include
country fixed effects in all regressions.27
In line with our model, our dependent variable is the (change in the) import shares
from FTA partners. Just as in the testing of H1, here too it would be inappropriate to
use dummies, as is standard in the literature, to measure the intensity of a country’s
FTA participation. First, because the analysis is at the country, not the dyad, level
here as well. Second, even if we forced the analysis to be at the dyad level, the wide
heterogeneity in FTAs discussed in the previous subsection would make the use of
dummies rather inadequate for our purposes.
To test H2, we then run the following specification:
(19)

   2it  + β3  FTAi, t−1 + Zitγ + ai + at + eit.
   it + β2  P
ΔFTAit = β0 + β1P

In equation (19) we measure Pr(enddemo) with its predicted hazard rate evaluated
 . We do so to eliminate the effect of FTAs on
at FTAt−1 = 0, which we denote by  P
our measure of political instability (we already include FTAt−1itself in (19)). We
 is a
also include the squared term of  P to capture possible nonlinearities. Since  P
constructed regressor, we adjust standard errors using bootstrapping methods. Our
 on FTA formation.
model predicts a positive impact of  P 

27
Even though much has been written about regionalism, we still know relatively little about what makes governments willing to form FTAs. Consider, for example, the seminal contribution by Baier and Bergstrand (2004).
Most of the explanatory variables they consider are either geographical, which do not change over time, or “structural,” in the sense of changing little over time (e.g., factor endowments). Since we work with a panel, our fixed
effects capture all of those fixed/almost fixed factors.
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Note that equation (19) is a standard dynamic panel data model, implying that
standard fixed effects estimation will yield biased estimations of β3 ,but also of
 1, where our main interest lies. This problem should be rather mild in
β2 and of β
our context, however. The reason is that we have a long panel, which goes from
1960 to 2007 (i.e., the number of periods in our panel is T = 48). As shown by
Nickell (1981), the biases from using standard fixed effect estimation in dynamic
panels decrease with T. Judson and Owen (1999), using a Monte Carlo analysis, show, in particular, that estimation using the standard procedure is actually
preferable to alternatives that take full account of the dynamic component of the
panel if T = 30 (the longest panel they consider). Since we have T = 48 in our
main specification, we follow the more standard approach, paralleling the specification adopted by Persson and Tabellini (2009) to estimate their growth equation. Nevertheless, we also report and discuss a dynamic panel estimation of H2
in Section VIC.
C. Auxiliary Predictions
In addition to testing H1 and H2, we develop additional auxiliary predictions
motivated by the model. Their goal is to help identify the mechanism behind the
main empirical findings (or to rule out alternative ones).
Our main auxiliary predictions consider the type, or depth, of agreements. An
unavoidable difficulty in any empirical analysis of regional trade agreements is
that some of them represent little more than scraps of paper. We turn this problem
to our favor, by examining whether our predictions hold similarly for the shallowest arrangements. If the mechanism at work is indeed the destruction of rents,
it should not.
To determine which agreements are ”shallow,” we follow a simple set of rules.
First, we classify as free trade agreements all free trade areas and customs unions
ratified under GATT’s Article XXIV, which we refer to as full-fledged free trade
agreements (or FTAs, for brevity). The Article specifies minimum liberalization
requirements that all preferential trade agreements have to satisfy. Developed countries must notify their agreements to the WTO under Article XXIV. Trading blocs
formed only by developing economies can notify either under Article XXIV or under
the Enabling Clause, which imposes much fewer constraints on what bloc members
must accomplish. Accordingly, we consider agreements notified under the Enabling
Clause—as well as those not notified to the WTO—to be partial-scope preferential
trade agreements (PTAs, in short). This rule, while sensible, tends to overstate the
number of PTAs relative to FTAs, because some developing countries may choose
to notify the agreement under the Enabling Clause (to gain flexibility in their liberalization path) even when they intend to liberalize significantly vis-à-vis each other.
To avoid this bias, we delved into the literature studying specific agreements to identify such cases. We identify three agreements—Mercosur, CAN, and ASEAN—that
are notified under the Enabling Clause but have implementation rates comparable to
several Article XXIV FTAs. Accordingly, we classify them as FTAs (this classification does not have any qualitatively important effect on our estimates). We could not
find studies providing similar evidence for other Enabling Clause PTAs.
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Thus, we test H1 and H2 for FTAs and for PTAs independently. If destruction
of rents is a central force behind H1 and H2, they should hold among FTAs but not
among PTAs.
To investigate whether the relationship behind H1 is driven by some other forces
put forward in the literature, we also make the following empirical distinctions:
(i) FTAs with more democratic partners and FTAs with other partners;
(ii) participation in FTAs and participation in more general international
organizations;
(iii) FTAs that require members to be democratic and FTAs that do not have such
a requirement.
The distinction in (i) allows us to potentially rule out FTAs that help to sustain
democracies just because more democratic partners demand it. The distinction in
(ii) permits us to rule out FTAs that help to sustain democracies just because of signaling effects. The distinction in (iii) allows us to distinguish the political-economy
forces behind FTAs from those stemming from institutional rules.
Similarly, to investigate whether the relationship behind H2 is driven by forces
different from those we put forward, we identify empirically:
(iv) countries that have recently gone through regime changes;
(v) the volatility of democracy within countries’ democratic regimes;
(vi) the intensity of political competition within a democratic regime.
The goal in each of these cases is to verify whether the formation of FTAs is driven
by the expectation of regime change, as H2 indicates, or by some other plausible
mechanism that may be correlated with our main independent variable.
We elaborate on these auxiliary predictions in Section VI, both on their rationale and on their empirical implementation. We also carry out additional robustness
analysis, as we explain there.
IV. Data

We have a panel with 116 countries that have experienced democracy at some
point during 1960–2007. Not every country is included because our study is
restricted to democracies. In the online Appendix (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ornelas/
Liu&Ornelas_Appendices.pdf) we list the countries covered in our enddemo duration analysis. More than 200 countries are covered in the construction of our FTA
measures, as explained below.
Data for the agreements come from the WTO website and also from information
available in several other sources. In the online Appendix, we list the agreements in
our dataset with their types (FTAs or PTAs) and other information about the data
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Table 1—Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables
Variable

Description

Mean

enddemoit
Dummy indicating the end of a democracy
0.022
Lagged import share from FTA partners
0.214
FTA_impshi, t−1
Lagged import share from PTA partners
0.063
PTA_impshi, t−1
Change in FTA_impsh from previous year
0.010
ΔFTA_impshit
Change in PTA_impsh from previous year
0.002
ΔPTA_impshit 
8.004
log(GDP/capita)i, t−1Lagged log(GDP/capita)
Lagged current domestic democratic capital
0.573
DOMi, t−1
Lagged foreign democratic capital
0.041
FORi, t−1
warit
Current war indicator
0.063
Lagged war indicator
0.066
wari, t−1
socialisti
Socialist legal origin dummy
0.109
Africai
Africa dummy
0.169
Middleeasti
Middle East region dummy
0.032
Spain_colonyi
UK colony dummy
0.189
UK_colonyi
Spain colony dummy
0.307
0.358
(M/GDP)i, t−1
Lagged import/GDP
durationit
Duration of democracy (number of years passed) 37.955
hazardit 
Predicted hazard
0.025
enddemo05i t
enddemo with stricter thresholds
0.019
enddemo64i t
enddemo with stricter thresholds
0.011
FTA_impsh
FTA_impsh with more democratic partners
0.056
_moredemoi, t−1

SD

Min

Max

0.145
0.282
0.128
0.067
0.032
1.522
0.344
0.140
0.243
0.249
0.312
0.375
0.176
0.391
0.461
0.197
43.882
0.038
0.136
0.102
0.165

0
0
0
−0.451
−0.442
4.400
0
−0.217
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.036
1
0
0
0
0

1
0.920
0.698
0.761
0.502
10.632
1
0.261
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1.528
208
0.386
1
1
0.899

Notes: The descriptive statistics of most of the variables in this table are based on the sample with 2,827 observations used in regressions (2)–(5) in Table 2, except for the last three variables, which are based on regressions (1)
and (3) in Table 4 and the second regression in Table 6, respectively. Subscript i refers to country i and subscript t
refers to year t.

sources. As discussed in the previous section, we proxy a country’s intensity of FTA
participation by its imports from FTA partners as a share of its total imports in a
given year. We use an analogous definition for PTA participation:
•
•

FTA_impsh: a country’s imports from FTA partners as a share of its total
imports;
PTA_impsh: a country’s imports from PTA partners as a share of its total
imports.

As shown in Table 1, the average import share from PTAs in our sample is 0.06,
compared to 0.21 for FTAs. We obtain the import data from the IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics. To construct the shares, we carefully consider the dates of the formation of new blocs, of the accession of new members, and of the deactivation of
existing blocs.
As we follow Persson and Tabellini’s (2009) general estimation strategy, our first
definition of democracy failure follows their definition, which relies on Polity IV
data (available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). This entails
defining a regime as “democratic” if and only if its polity2 score (which ranges from
−10 to 10, with higher values representing more democratic regimes) is strictly
positive.28 In a democratic spell, enddemo is zero as long as democracy remains
28
Countries enter the sample as they become independent, but only if they have a strictly positive polity2 score,
since our study is restricted to democracies.
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uninterrupted, and becomes unity when it ends. If a democracy does not end during
our sample, enddemo is right-censored. There are 61 episodes of enddemo in our
sample according to this definition (see the online Appendix for the list of episodes).
For those transitions, the median score before the change is 4.8, whereas the median
score after the change is −3.5; the median drop in the polity2 score is 8.8 points. A
representative example of the median case of democracy failure is Thailand from
1970 to 1971, when its polity score fell from 2 to −7.
We also use a different measure of democracy failure from a recent database
developed by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010, available at https://netfiles.
uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DD_page.html).29 Their measure has the advantage of
offering a dichotomous classification of democracy/autocracy that yields a straightforward definition of the transitions—unlike the Polity index, where transition needs
to be defined according to (necessarily) arbitrary thresholds. There are 44 cases of
enddemo in our sample according to this definition (see online Appendix).
Following Persson and Tabellini (2009), the construction of DOM and FOR is
also based on polity2 scores. DOM is defined as
 	

τ = t−t0 

DOMit  = (1 − δ )  ∑  di, t−τ δτ,
τ=0

where δ is a discount factor and d i, t−tis a dummy for a strictly positive polity2 score.
The first positive dummy for each country is either the first year with a strictly positive polity2 score or the first year the country appears in the Polity dataset, which
for some countries goes back to 1800. As Persson and Tabellini, we find that what
really matters for democratic stability in DOM is current DOM (i.e., the current
democratic spell), whereas the portion of DOM due to previous democratic spells
is usually insignificant in the regressions. Accordingly, we use current DOM in all
of our regressions, so t0 corresponds to the first year in which dit= 1 in the current
democratic spell. For the discount factor, we adopt δ = 0.95; results change little
for δ ∈ [0.94, 0.99], the range considered by Person and Tabellini. In turn, FOR is
defined as

(

)

Distij
FORit  = ∑ Polityjt   1 −  _   /Nt  ,
DEq
j≠i
where Polityjtis country j’s polity2 score at t (rescaled to the [−1, 1] interval), Distij 
is the distance between the capitals of countries i and j, DEq is half the length of the
equator, and Nt is the number of independent countries in the world at t. Thus, the
closer a country is to other democracies, the greater its own stock of foreign capital.
GDP per capita data come from the World Development Indicators database. Data
on wars come from the Correlates of War dataset and include all wars a country was
involved in. Legal origin data are drawn from La Porta et al. (1999). Colonial history variables come from the CIA’s World Fact Book. WTO membership data come

29

Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) extend the classification proposed initially by Alvarez et al. (1996).
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from the WTO website. Trade openness measures are obtained from the Penn World
Table 6.3. The data used to calculate the number of international organizations
(IO) come from the database for International Governmental Organizations (IGO,
v2.3).30 The data on formal military leader as chief executive are based on Gandhi
and Przeworski (2006).31 Table 1 lists the definitions of all the variables used in the
main regressions and provides descriptive statistics.
V. Empirical Results

A. Does Participation in FTAs Affect Democracy Survival?
We study first the impact of lagged FTA participation on the duration of democracy. Table 2 shows the duration analysis results for five different specifications.
The logit regression (1) uses only the FTA import share variable as a regressor.
This variable alone explains around 7 percent of the variation in enddemo, as shown
by the Pseudo R2. In regression (2), we add all control variables and the duration
dependence terms. It turns out that a second-order polynomial of the time counter
produces the best fit of the model. In regression (3), we use country random effects,
yet the LR test of the random effects (“ρ”) is insignificant at the 10 percent level and
the changes in the estimated coefficients are overall quite small. Standard errors in
those regressions are clustered at the country level. Columns 4 and 5 show results
for the continuous time duration models, where the dependent variable measures the
number of years passed since the onset of a democratic regime. Column 4 shows
the coefficient estimates of the Weibull regression, whereas column 5 displays the
coefficients of the PH Cox model.
In all 5 specifications, the coefficient of the FTA import share is negative and
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This result supports our first hypothesis that greater participation in FTAs lowers the probability of democratic failure
in a country. As for the control variables, GDP/capita, DOM, FOR, and UK colony
dummy have a negative and statistically significant impact on enddemo, while the
war dummy has the opposite effect. The estimated coefficients of the other variables
are statistically insignificant.
Table 3 reports estimates when we use the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s
(2010) definition of democratic failure. Duration dependence terms are updated
accordingly. Results are qualitatively very similar to those from Table 2, although
the estimated coefficients are larger. This reinforces the evidence that more FTA
participation tends to increase the longevity of democracies.
Are the estimates also economically significant? It is useful to interpret the
coefficients in terms of marginal effects. Consider the logit regression result in
column 2 of Table 3. The corresponding average marginal effect of FTA_impsh
is 0.06. It implies that a 1 standard deviation increase in the FTA import share
(0.282) would decrease the hazard of enddemo by about 1.7 percentage points
(= 0.282 × 0.06 × 100), on average, which is about 67 percent of the average
30
31

Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/IGOs/IGOv2.3.htm.
We thank James Raymond Vreeland for kindly sharing the data with us.
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Table 2—Enddemo Regression Results Using Polity Data, FTAs
logit
(1)

FTA_impshi, t−1
log(GDP/capita)i, t−1

−5.907***
(1.864)

DOMi, t−1
FORi, t−1
warit
wari, t−1
socialisti
Africai
Middleeasti
Spain_colonyi
UK_colonyi
(M/GDP)i, t−1
durationit
duration  2it 
country RE
ρ
Test ρ = 0 ( p-value)
Pseudo R
 2
0.070
log Lik
−309.2
Observations

3,008

logit
(2)

xtlogit
(3)

Weibull
(4)

PH Cox
(5)

−3.027**
−3.131**
−3.410**
−2.938**
(1.335)
(1.427)
(1.381)
(1.317)
−0.558*** −0.628*** −0.741*** −0.569***
(0.150)
(0.239)
(0.153)
(0.149)
−11.935** −11.783
−17.830*** −71.748a
(5.583)
(8.839)
(4.642)
(0.000)
−4.723*** −5.116*** −5.951*** −5.028***
(1.569)
(1.730)
(1.607)
(1.535)
1.285*
1.297**
1.258*
0.972*
(0.708)
(0.643)
(0.672)
(0.545)
−0.290
−0.323
−0.677
−0.292
(0.689)
(0.681)
(0.701)
(0.602)
0.256
0.395
0.270
0.201
(0.587)
(0.707)
(0.621)
(0.583)
0.395
0.456
0.050
0.270
(0.406)
(0.466)
(0.359)
(0.361)
0.255
0.347
0.978
0.444
(1.190)
(1.179)
(0.895)
(1.049)
−0.485
−0.470
−0.450
−0.451
(0.486)
(0.490)
(0.471)
(0.449)
−1.216**
−1.301**
−1.233*** −1.229***
(0.477)
(0.507)
(0.426)
(0.406)
0.083
0.095
−0.032
−0.032
(1.042)
(0.890)
(0.981)
(0.914)
0.613**
0.631
(0.260)
(0.411)
−0.009**
−0.010*
(0.004)
(0.006)
Yes
0.060
[0.323]
0.211
−232.2
2,827

−232.1
2,827

−97.15
2,827

0.111
−235.4
2,827

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.
a
In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of DOMi ,t−1could not be estimated and
was reported as a zero.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

predicted hazard (2.5 p.p.). Compared with the variables Persson and Tabellini
(2009) put forward as key determinants of democracy survival, this reduction is
greater (in absolute terms) than that following a 1 standard deviation increase in
foreign democratic capital (1.3 p.p.), though smaller than the corresponding figure
for domestic democratic capital (8 p.p.). Or consider Mongolia, the only country
without any FTA by 2010. According to the logit estimate, Mongolia’s hazard rate
in 2005 would drop from 4.76 percent to 2.42 percent if it had the same FTA import
share as Chile (FTA_impsh = 0.39 in 2005), or to just 0.4 percent, if Mongolia had
the same FTA import share as Mexico (FTA_impsh = 0.72 in 2005).
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Table 3—Enddemo Regression Results Using Cheibub et al.’s (2010)
Democracy Data, FTAs
logit
(1)

FTA_impshi,t−1
log(GDP/capita)i,t−1

−8.144***
(2.265)

DOMi,t−1
FORi,t−1
warit
wari,t−1
 
socialisti

Middleeasti

0.741
(0.531)
−0.833
(0.517)
−0.557
(1.491)
0.132**
(0.062)
−0.003**
(0.001)

Spain_colonyi
UK_colonyi
(M/GDP)i,t−1
durationit
duration  2it 

Observations

−4.963**
(1.930)
−0.400*
(0.209)
−2.040
(1.292)
−5.566***
(1.688)
0.772
(1.062)
−0.652
(1.041)
1.334**
(0.654)

Africai

country RE
ρ
Test ρ = 0 ( p-value)
Pseudo R
 2
log Lik

logit
(2)

xtlogit
(3)

Weibull
(4)

PH Cox
(5)

−5.262*
−4.912*** −3.986**
(3.164)
(1.804)
(1.890)
−0.441*
−0.666*** −0.548***
(0.229)
(0.223)
(0.196)
−2.197
−3.374*** −1.437
(1.506)
(1.137)
(1.352)
−5.800*** −7.117*** −6.184***
(1.908)
(2.008)
(1.996)
0.744
1.069
1.387**
(0.816)
(0.669)
(0.646)
−0.622
−1.138*
−1.426**
(0.872)
(0.649)
(0.659)
−18.161
−15.061*** −44.731a
(8,057)
(0.875)
(0.000)
1.414**
1.555**
1.053*
(0.633)
(0.687)
(0.567)
−18.281
−13.799*** −43.373a
(16,401)
(1.341)
(0.000)
0.764
0.919
0.393
(0.492)
(0.596)
(0.534)
−0.938
−1.134**
−0.965*
(0.585)
(0.557)
(0.539)
0.418
0.053
−0.572
(1.279)
(1.136)
(1.126)
0.157*
(0.092)
−0.003*
(0.002)
Yes
0.073
[0.255]

0.085
−248.1

0.211
−168.9

3,279

2,122

−168.8
2,484

−63.48
2,396

0.193
−116.0
2,396

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.
a
In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviations of socialistiand Middleeasticould not
be estimated and were reported as zeros.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of the effects. Using the specification from
c olumn 2 of Table 2, we plot the estimated hazard against the share of imports that
stem from FTA partners for Mercosur, South and East European countries. As the
figure clearly shows, the hazards out of democracy drop sharply right after those
countries become significantly engaged in FTAs.
In Table 4 we show that, when using the polity2 scores to define transition, the precise level of the threshold is not critical to our qualitative results. Surely, when defining
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Figure 1. Hazard Out of Democracy and Share of Imports from FTA Partners, Selected Countries
Notes: “FTA_impsh” denotes the share of the country’s imports that originates from FTA partners. “Hazard” is
the hazard out of democracy, as explained in Section IV. The figure uses the estimates from column 2 of Table 2.

democracy failure by a move in the polity2 score from strictly positive to nonpositive,
we may capture some very minor political changes (say a change in the score from 1
to 0). Of course we also use the binary measure from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
(2010), which is not open to this type of criticism, but it is nevertheless useful to check
whether such marginal changes in democratic status are driving our results with the
Polity data. In columns 1–3, we no longer classify as democracy failure the cases where
the polity2 score drops by less than five points in the three years following the last
year with a strictly positive polity score.32 In columns 4–6, we follow Mansfield and
Pevehouse (2006) and set the threshold for democratic status at a higher level, 7, and
again we classify as democracy failure only cases where there is a nontrivial drop (of at
least 4 points) in the polity2 score. With both of these stricter definitions of democracy,
the coefficient estimates remain statistically significant; they also become larger.
Table 5 shows in turn the results for partial-scope PTAs, using both Polity
and Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s definitions of democratic transition.
If the mechanism through which trade agreements help democracies to consolidate is the d estruction of protectionist rents, as proxied by countries’ FTA
shares, then we should detect an effect of FTAs on democracy survival but
not of PTAs. Indeed, when adding the PTA import share to the regression,
Because the country random effects component in column (3) of Tables 2 and 3 are not significant, as shown
by the estimated “ρ” and its p-values, we use logit without random effects in Table 4 and some of the other robustness checks reported later.
32

Vol. 6 No. 2

Liu and Ornelas: Trade Agreements and Democracy Consolidation

55

Table 4—Robustness Checks, Enddemo Regressions with Stricter Thresholds
Enddemo05
logit
(1)

FTA_impshi,t−1
log(GDP/capita)i,t−1
DOMi,t−1
FORi,t−1
warit
wari,t−1
 
socialisti
Africai
Middleeasti
Spain_colonyi 
UK_colonyi
(M/GDP)i,t−1
durationit 
duration  2it 
Pseudo R
 2
log Lik
Observations

Weibull
(2)

Enddemo64
PH Cox
(3)

−3.178**
−3.653**
−3.098**
(1.445)
(1.474)
(1.385)
−0.594*** −0.805*** −0.617***
(0.156)
(0.164)
(0.153)
−3.191
−17.027*** −71.045a
(2.612)
(4.712)
(0.000)
−5.177*** −6.132*** −5.046***
(1.643)
(1.680)
(1.573)
1.790***
1.762***
1.470***
(0.588)
(0.495)
(0.415)
−0.678
−0.940*
−0.541
(0.556)
(0.486)
(0.437)
0.399
0.309
0.220
(0.613)
(0.679)
(0.636)
0.250
0.210
−0.021
(0.437)
(0.403)
(0.408)
0.345
1.137
0.542
(1.269)
(0.938)
(1.091)
−0.743
−0.878
−0.872*
(0.498)
(0.549)
(0.511)
−1.411*** −1.498*** −1.455***
(0.523)
(0.481)
(0.456)
0.069
0.266
0.217
(1.143)
(1.145)
(1.082)
0.219*
(0.126)
−0.004**
(0.002)
0.212
−207.2
2,819

−84.32
2,772

logit
(4)

−5.408**
(2.176)
−0.610**
(0.247)
−5.618
(6.142)
−1.181
(3.116)
0.954
(0.851)
0.948
(0.948)
−0.983
(0.939)
−0.536
(0.652)

Weibull
(5)

PH Cox
(6)

−5.897*** −5.779***
(2.155)
(2.019)
−0.923*** −0.708***
(0.296)
(0.266)
−18.986*
−4.063
(11.031)
(5.836)
−2.661
−1.790
(3.147)
(3.069)
0.780
0.340
(0.972)
(1.279)
0.662
1.955
(0.841)
(1.345)
−0.735
−1.047
(0.943)
(0.989)
−0.703
−0.748
(0.597)
(0.611)
−14.263*** −44.358b
(1.108)
(0.000)
−2.861*** −2.628*** −3.266***
(0.867)
(0.999)
(1.050)
−1.100
−1.488*
−1.223
(0.759)
(0.777)
(0.808)
0.983
1.575
1.290
(1.434)
(1.311)
(1.357)
0.389
(0.258)
−0.009*
(0.005)

0.135
−192.5

0.288
−82.90

2,772

1,986

−33.90
2,060

0.254
−58.44
2,060

Notes: Regressions (1)–(3) consider only the cases of enddemo where the polity2 score transits from strictly positive to nonpositive and drops by at least 5 points within a 3-year window since the transition. Regressions (4)–(6)
consider only the cases of enddemo where the polity2 score transits from 7 or higher to 6 or lower and drops by at
least 4 points within a 3-year window since the transition. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.
a 
In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of DOMi,t−1
 could not be estimated and was reported as a zero.
b 
In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of Middleeasti could not be estimated and was reported as a zero.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

its coefficient is always statistically indistinguishable from zero (while the
coefficient on FTA_impsh hardly changes), confirming that partial, incomplete processes of preferential trade liberalization have no meaningful effect on
democracy survival.33
33
If we run the enddemo regressions with PTA_impsh while dropping FTA_impsh, the estimates for
PTA_impsh remain very similar—always statistically insignificant.
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Table 5—Enddemo Regression Results with Partial-Scope PTAs
Enddemo based on polity
logit
(1)

FTA_impshi,t−1
PTA_impshi,t−1
log(GDP/capita)i,t−1
DOMi,t−1
FORi,t−1
warit
wari ,t−1
socialisti
Africai
Middleeasti
Spain_colonyi
UK_colonyi
(M/GDP)i,t−1
durationit
duration  2it 
Pseudo R
 2
log Lik
Observations

Weibull
(2)

PH Cox
(3)

−2.996**
−3.418**
−2.929**
(1.327)
(1.384)
(1.315)
0.344
0.121
−0.199
(1.451)
(1.373)
(1.304)
−0.557*** −0.743*** −0.567***
(0.151)
(0.157)
(0.148)
−12.089** −17.857*** −71.139a
(5.779)
(4.694)
(0.000)
−4.905*** −5.852*** −5.087***
(1.512)
(1.586)
(1.536)
1.297*
1.250*
0.975*
(0.717)
(0.673)
(0.550)
−0.294
−0.674
−0.292
(0.692)
(0.697)
(0.603)
0.296
0.243
0.215
(0.576)
(0.647)
(0.604)
0.411
0.040
0.277
(0.394)
(0.367)
(0.365)
0.194
1.024
0.421
(1.315)
(0.979)
(1.126)
−0.496
−0.445
−0.455
(0.501)
(0.476)
(0.458)
−1.227*** −1.227*** −1.232***
(0.465)
(0.421)
(0.403)
0.066
0.106
−0.003
(1.085)
(1.000)
(0.938)
0.619**
(0.268)
−0.009**
(0.004)
0.211
−232.2
2,827

−97.14
2,827

“tta” based on Cheibub et al. (2010)
logit
(4)

−5.159**
(2.041)
−1.023
(1.649)
−0.402*
(0.210)
−2.066
(1.334)
−4.898***
(1.764)
0.755
(1.050)
−0.645
(1.033)
1.279**
(0.634)
0.738
(0.534)
−0.811
(0.509)
−0.685
(1.585)
0.133**
(0.064)
−0.003**
(0.001)

0.111
−235.4

0.212
−168.7

2,827

2,122

Weibull
(5)

PH Cox
(6)

−4.801*** −3.763**
(1.770)
(1.847)
1.055
1.303
(1.799)
(1.539)
−0.666*** −0.558***
(0.224)
(0.196)
−3.304*** −1.396
(1.163)
(1.330)
−7.882*** −7.233***
(2.020)
(2.049)
1.085
1.409**
(0.681)
(0.683)
−1.159*
−1.465**
(0.651)
(0.682)
−13.479*** −37.490***
(0.895)
(0.764)
1.601**
1.134**
(0.682)
(0.571)
−12.589*** −37.624***
(1.394)
(1.345)
0.945
0.445
(0.593)
(0.530)
−1.160**
−1.023**
(0.545)
(0.509)
0.549
0.230
(1.212)
(1.191)

−63.29
2,396

0.195
−115.7
2,396

Notes: The dependent variable in regressions (1)–(3) is the enddemo measure based on the polity2 scores. The
dependent variable in regressions (4)–(6) is the transition to autocracy (“tta”) measure from Cheibub et al. (2010).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.
a 
In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of DOMi,t−1could not be estimated and was reported as a zero.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

It is also possible that FTAs help to sustain democracies not because of their
rent destruction effects, but because democratic countries demand democracy
from their FTA partners. To test for this alternative mechanism, we define another
FTA import share measure, FTA_impsh_moredemo, which is constructed just as
FTA_impsh except that it covers only the imports from FTA partners with more
democratic regimes, according to the polity2 scores. We add that variable to the
regression to capture the additional effect that FTAs with more democratic countries may have on the political regime. If only the pressure from more democratic
partners matters for the relationship, the coefficient on FTA_impsh_moredemo
would be significant but not the coefficient on FTA_impsh. Table 6 shows the
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Table 6—Enddemo Regression Results, More Democratic FTAs vs. Less Democratic FTAs
logit
(1)

FTA_impshi,t−1
FTA_impsh_moredemoi,t−1
log(GDP/capita)i,t−1

−7.803**
(3.093)
3.901
(2.545)

DOMi,t−1
FORi,t−1
warit
wari,t−1
 
socialisti
Africai
Middleeasti
Spain_colonyi
UK_colonyi
(M/GDP)i,t−1
durationit
duration  2it 
country RE
ρ
Test ρ = 0 ( p-value)
Pseudo R
 2
log Lik
Observations

logit
(2)

−3.872**
(1.918)
1.696
(1.909)
−0.564***
(0.152)
−12.023**
(5.606)
−4.802***
(1.587)
1.282*
(0.706)
−0.286
(0.686)
0.227
(0.585)
0.379
(0.404)
0.244
(1.194)
−0.489
(0.487)
−1.228***
(0.475)
0.023
(1.030)
0.617**
(0.261)
−0.009**
(0.004)

0.073
−307.6

0.212
−231.9

2,989

2,823

xtlogit
(3)

−4.013*
(2.167)
1.779
(2.778)
−0.627***
(0.240)
−11.877
(8.867)
−5.144***
(1.723)
1.293**
(0.641)
−0.314
(0.679)
0.350
(0.707)
0.433
(0.460)
0.328
(1.175)
−0.476
(0.486)
−1.306**
(0.507)
0.017
(0.885)
0.633
(0.412)
−0.010*
(0.006)

Weibull
(4)

−4.695**
(2.038)
2.748
(1.987)
−0.748***
(0.157)
−17.848***
(4.623)
−6.122***
(1.650)
1.261*
(0.680)
−0.670
(0.706)
0.217
(0.622)
0.044
(0.356)
0.973
(0.913)
−0.460
(0.473)
−1.279***
(0.436)
0.151
(0.967)

Yes
0.053
[0.342]
−231.8
2,823

−96.50
2,823

PH Cox
(5)

−3.785**
(1.870)
1.739
(1.883)
−0.575***
(0.151)
−67.421a
(0.000)
−5.106***
(1.550)
0.965*
(0.545)
−0.285
(0.601)
0.165
(0.584)
0.254
(0.359)
0.437
(1.054)
−0.452
(0.451)
−1.238***
(0.405)
0.155
(0.905)

0.112
−235.0
2,823

Notes: FTA_impsh_moredemo covers only the FTA partners with more democratic regimes based on polity scores.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.
a
In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of DOMi,t−1could not be estimated and was reported as a zero.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

results. The results again indicate a sizable role of FTAs in sustaining democracy.
However, there is no distinguishable additional effect from having the FTAs with
more democratic partners. Thus, pressure from more democratic FTA partners is
not a driver of our results.
Now, a potential problem in our analysis is the reverse causality between FTA participation and Pr(enddemo). However, if our second hypothesis is valid (as we confirm
to be the case in the next subsection), a greater risk of democratic failure would tend
to induce more FTA participation. Without addressing this endogeneity issue, we find
a negative effect of FTAs on enddemo. Had we eliminated it, the estimate would tend
to be even more negative. In other words, the endogeneity problem biases the result
against the hypothesis that FTAs reduce the risk of democratic failure.
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But we also address the endogeneity of FTA_impsh in the enddemo regressions
formally. Although our specifications for the enddemo regression are all nonlinear,
we now estimate it using a linear probability model (LPM), so that we can apply
two-stage least squares (2SLS). Another benefit of LPM is that we can use country
fixed effects in the enddemo regression without losing observations. To run 2SLS, we
need instruments for FTA_impsh. Explaining the evolution of FTA formation over
time is a notoriously difficult task, as most attempts to explain FTA formation rely on
time invariant or structural country characteristics. We rely instead on a recent line
of research that explores “contagion” effects: when neighbors of a country engage
in FTAs, the country becomes more likely to do the same. Egger and Larch (2008)
and Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012), using spatial econometric methods in a bilateral
dataset, find strong evidence for contagion effects in FTA formation. We therefore
construct our first instrument based on the contagion effects of FTA formation. We
use bilateral data to construct the contagion measure at the country level, to fit into
our country-year panel data analysis. We first calculate FTA_impshi t,−j for every
country i that imports from country j in year t after excluding country i’s own FTA
imports from j. Contagionj tof country j in year t is then calculated as the weighted
average of FTA_impshi t,−j. We use different types of weights based on GDPit and
distanceij, where distancei j is the great circle distance between i and j. We also use
remoteness as instrument, defined as a country’s distance to the rest of the world
(ROW) weighted by countries’ GDPs. As some authors (e.g., Baier and Bergstrand
2004) argue, a country’s remoteness affects its propensity to engage in FTAs. Our
presumption is that both contagion and remoteness affect countries’ likelihood of
forming FTAs but have no direct effect on the stability of their democracies.
Table 7 shows the results. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions.
The first-stage regression results show that contagion is a strong instrument for
FTA_impsh although remoteness is not. Together they are strong instruments as
showed by the large joint F-statistics, which range from 14 to 36. An overidentification test cannot reject the null that these instruments are valid. In the second-stage
regressions, lagged FTA_impsh remains significant at either the 1 percent or the
10 percent level. These results indicate that our finding that FTA participation helps
to consolidate democracies is not driven by endogenous factors.
B. Are Unstable Democracies More Likely to Seek Participation in FTAs?
We now turn to our second hypothesis. We use the predicted hazard rate from
the duration analysis to estimate how democratic instability affects FTA formation.
The hazard is predicted based on the first logit regression in Table 5, which includes
both FTA and PTA import shares.34 As discussed in Section IV, to capture only
the portion of the hazard unaffected by trade agreements, we predict the hazard
after setting FTA and PTA import shares to zero. The online Appendix displays a

34
The second-stage ΔFTA regressions do not change in any qualitatively important way when we use the specifications in Table 2. The same is true if we use Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s (2010) definition for transition to
autocracy as the dependent variable in the first stage.
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Table 7—Endogeneity of FTA_impsh in Enddemo Regressions, 2SLS
IV = Contagion
weighted by
1/log(dist)
1st stage
L.FTA
_impsh
(1)
FTA_impshi,t−1
 
log(GDP/capita)i,t−1
DOMi,t−1
FORi,t−1
warit
wari,t−1
 
(M/GDP)i,t−1
durationit
durationi t^2
remotenessit 
contagion_ldisti,t−1
 
contagionit_lgdpldisti,t−1
 

0.014
(0.039)
0.093
(0.120)
0.064
(0.140)
0.026
(0.020)
0.002
(0.014)
0.080
(0.080)
−0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
0.461
(2.301)
63.304***
(17.679)

2nd
stage
enddemo
(2)

−0.187*
(0.113)
−0.059***
(0.022)
0.076*
(0.041)
−0.170***
(0.056)
0.035
(0.027)
−0.018
(0.023)
−0.041
(0.044)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)

Observations

Yes
0.016
20.47
0.556

Yes

0.363
2,827

1st stage
L.FTA
_impsh
(3)

0.025
(0.041)
0.110
(0.122)
0.227
(0.138)
0.026
(0.020)
−0.000
(0.014)
0.102
(0.084)
0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
0.357
(2.337)

2nd
stage
enddemo
(4)

−0.349*
(0.203)
−0.053**
(0.024)
0.100**
(0.051)
−0.108
(0.079)
0.039
(0.027)
−0.018
(0.023)
−0.019
(0.051)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)

0.376**
(0.166)

contagionit_gdpdisti,t−1
 
country FE
Partial R
 2 
F-statistics for IV
Over-identification test
( p-value)
R2

IV = Contagion
weighted by
log(GDP)/log(dist)

Yes
0.011
14.25
0.530

2,827

1st stage
L.FTA
_impsh
(5)

0.021
(0.038)
0.144
(0.113)
0.232
(0.159)
0.025
(0.020)
−0.003
(0.015)
0.094
(0.085)
−0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
−0.109
(2.260)

2nd
stage
enddemo
(6)

−0.729***
(0.247)
−0.038
(0.026)
0.157***
(0.059)
0.040
(0.086)
0.047*
(0.028)
−0.020
(0.025)
0.031
(0.058)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.000**
(0.000)

0.372**
(0.178)
Yes

0.350
2,825

IV = Contagion
weighted by
GDP/dist

Yes
0.031
36.18
0.524

Yes

0.353
2,825

2,827

2,825

Notes: We use the variables contagion and remoteness as instruments for FTA_impsh. Remoteness is measured as a
country’s distance to the rest of the world (ROW) weighted by countries’ GDP. In regressions (1)–(2), contagion is
defined as the average FTA_impsh of all other countries (ROW) weighted by 1/log(distance) to the country in question, after we exclude the country’s own FTA exports to ROW. In regressions (3)–(4), we proceed analogously but
use log(GDP)/log(distance) as the weights in contagion. In regressions (5)–(6), we use GDP/distance as weights.
Contagion variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

h istogram of the predicted hazard, showing that it is below 15 percent for most of
the observations in our sample.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 display the regressions with the predicted hazard, where the dependent variable is the change in the FTA import share from the
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Table 8—Structural ΔFTA and ΔPTA Regression Results
ΔFTA_impsh

hazardit
hazardit ^2
FTA_impshi,t−1
 
PTA_impshi,t−1
log(GDP/capita)i,t−1
DOMi,t−1

(1)

0.337**
(0.152)
−0.766
(0.534)
−0.132***
(0.018)
0.005
(0.008)

FORi,t−1
warit
wari,t−1
 
(M/GDP)i,t−1
durationit

−0.010
(0.008)
0.001
(0.006)
0.000
(0.020)

durationi t^2
remotenessit 
contagionit _lgdpldisti,t−1
 

−0.334
(0.455)
1.046
(0.740)

(2)

0.383***
(0.160)
−0.853
(0.543)
−0.139***
(0.020)
0.004
(0.008)
0.008
(0.022)
0.179***
(0.071)
−0.011*
(0.008)
0.001
(0.006)
0.006
(0.019)
−0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
−0.789*
(0.475)
0.575
(0.689)

ΔPTA_impsh

(3)

(4)

−0.143
(0.091)
0.129
(0.317)

−0.107
(0.105)
0.019
(0.309)

−0.103***
(0.021)
−0.004
(0.005)

−0.111***
(0.024)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.009
(0.010)
−0.032
(0.034)
0.011***
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.004)
0.007
(0.009)
0.000
(0.000)
−0.000*
(0.000)
0.047
(0.290)
−0.548**
(0.262)

0.012***
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.004)
0.008
(0.010)

−0.075
(0.255)
−0.611**
(0.253)

year dummies
country FE
Within R
 2

Yes
Yes
0.118

Yes
Yes
0.121

Yes
Yes
0.098

Yes
Yes
0.101

Observations

2,826

2,826

2,826

2,826

Notes: Hazard is the predicted hazard based on the first enddemo logit regression in Table 5,
after we set FTA_impsh = PTA_impsh = 0. Standard errors in the second stage are corrected
by bootstrapping (500 replications).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

previous year (ΔFTA). We also include the square of the predicted hazard to allow
for possible nonlinear effects, as well as remoteness and contagion,35 as defined
above. Year dummies are included to capture global trends in the formation of trade
agreements. To control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, country fixed
effects are also included in the regression. Since the hazard is predicted from the
first stage with sampling errors, we use bootstrapping (500 replications) to adjust
the standard errors.
In column 1, the coefficient of the predicted hazard rate is positive and significant
at the 5 percent level, while its quadratic term is only marginally significant at the
35
We report the results from the regressions using contagion with weights given by log(GDP/distance). Results
are similar with the other weights used in the definition of contagion.
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15 percent level. This result supports our theoretical prediction that unstable democracies tend to form more FTAs than stable democracies. We can also quantify the
magnitude of the effect. At the mean value of the hazard (0.025), a 1 standard deviation increase in the hazard (0.038) would lead to about 1.3 percentage point increase
in the FTA import share. Or consider, for example, the case of Guatemala from 1966
to 1967, when its hazard shot up to 0.095 from 0.007. According to our estimates,
this should lead to an increase of 2.3 percentage points in Guatemala’s FTA import
share (the actual increase was 2.65 percentage points).
In column 2, we repeat the analysis from column 1 but include DOM, FOR, and
duration dependence terms in the second-stage regression. The purpose of doing this
is to check if our results are sensitive to these exclusion variables. The estimated
coefficient of the hazard show little sensitivity to those changes.36
The last two columns of Table 8 report the results from the analogous exercise for
the formation of partial-scope trade agreements, ΔPTAs. The effect of the hazard in
this case is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, political instability has no
identifiable effect on the formation of partial-scope trade agreements. This is consistent with the mechanism we develop, where unstable democracies seek to diminish
the rents available to those in power by increasing participation in FTAs—but not
in PTAs.
C. Robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results along several dimensions.
The accompanying tables are in the online Appendix.
First, we investigate whether our FTA import share variable captures mostly
deepening of existing FTAs or the formation of new FTAs. Although the interpretation of the results is similar in both cases, it is useful to disentangle the two effects to
check whether the formation of new FTAs matters on its own. To do so, we construct
an alternative FTA import share measure (FTA_impsh60) by replacing current year
imports with the imports in 1960, the first year in our sample. This measure excludes
all variations in our main independent variable except those that come from the formation of new FTA links. We find that doing so increases the magnitude of the FTA
coefficients slightly, relative to their levels in Table 2.
Second, we investigate the role of the GATT/WTO in consolidating democracies. The impact of FTAs on the availability of rents is subtle. Due to potential trade
diversion effects, it is conceivable that FTAs may lead to the creation of rents, as
some authors have argued; the role of our model is to show that, once one accounts
for the endogeneity of the external tariffs, FTAs actually tend to destroy rents. By
contrast, it is more straightforward to see that participation in multilateral trade
agreements, such as the GATT/WTO, if it has any effect on the availability of protectionist rents, it must be a negative one. In light of our model, this should lower the
risk of democratic breakdown.

36
We also tried both excluding DOM and the duration dependence terms while keeping FOR in the second
stage. The results remain virtually unchanged.
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We therefore add a WTO membership dummy as an additional regressor to our
existing enddemo regressions. The variable turns out to be highly insignificant.
This may reflect the historically asymmetric treatment of developed and developing
countries in the GATT. As Bagwell and Staiger (2012) point out, this asymmetry
is codified in a set of “special and differential treatment” clauses that effectively
exempted developing countries from making reciprocal tariff concessions under the
GATT. This changed during the Uruguay Round (UR), which lasted from 1986 to
1994. Since then, the requirements on liberalization at accession became considerably more stringent. Subramanian and Wei (2007) show that, indeed, the change
in accession rules matter: GATT/WTO membership does not have any discernible
effect on the import levels of developing countries that joined before the UR, but
has a positive and statistically significant effect for developing countries that joined
since then. As in practice our hypotheses apply mainly to developing countries
(most industrial countries display high levels of democratic capital throughout our
sample period), it is therefore not surprising that a single GATT/WTO dummy variable shows no relationship with democracy consolidation.
To find out whether that is indeed the reason behind the lack of statistically
meaningful influence of GATT/WTO membership on democracy consolidation, we
look at differential effects driven by the GATT institutional changes. Analogously
to Subramanian and Wei (2007), we split the WTO membership dummy in two:
WTO_ pre1990 equals 1 from the year a country joined the GATT as a formal member provided that this happened before 1990; WTO_ from1990 equals 1 from the
year a country joined the GATT/WTO since 1990.37 We find that the coefficient on
WTO_ pre1990 is highly insignificant, whereas the coefficient on WTO_ from1990
is negative and marginally significant at the 15 percent level. One may interpret these
results as suggestive that GATT/WTO membership after the change in the accession
requirements has a positive effect on the consolidation of democracies. However, a
more cautious interpretation, to which we subscribe, is that reliable estimates just
cannot be obtained due to the limited variation over time of GATT/WTO membership. This is highlighted by the strict absence of cases in which a WTO member that
joined since 1995 had its democratic system disrupted. As a result, if we use 1995 as
the threshold for accession under the new criteria, the logit specification cannot estimate the effect of being a “new” WTO member on the probability that democracy is
disrupted, whereas the Weibull and Cox duration models provide implausibly large
estimates. On the other hand, regardless of how we include GATT/WTO membership in the regressions, the effect of FTA_impsh hardly changes.
Third, motivated by the findings of Pevehouse (2005) that participation in
international organizations, broadly defined, can help democracies to endure, we
also test whether the effects we find for FTAs are not capturing the effect of
engagement in international organizations (IOs) more generally. This would matter, as the reasoning for the latter relies on signaling effects, whereas our emphasis is on a commitment to destroy protectionist rents. Fourth, Cheibub (2006)
37
As Subramanian and Wei (2007) point out, the changes in the accession requirements happened during the
Uruguay Round (1986–1994). They show that using any year between 1990 and 1994 as the threshold makes little
difference for their results.
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shows that having a former military leader as the chief executive has a negative
effect on democracy survival. This is confirmed by the extreme bound analysis
in Gassebner, Lamla, and Vreeland (2013). Thus, we include the lagged number of IOs a country belongs to and a dummy variable indicating whether the
executive leader is a former military officer. The estimated coefficient for formal
military leader in the country is always statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The coefficient on the IO variable is negative and significant in some specifications, indicating that engagement in IOs in general help democracies to endure.
Nevertheless, introducing that variable has virtually no effect on our estimates of
how FTA participation affects democracy survival.
Fifth, it is possible that our results are driven by a small number of observations
for which alternative mechanisms may generate the same statistical association. For
example, many previously socialist countries both established democratic regimes
and entered in FTAs during the 1990s, but also went through many other economic
and institutional changes. Are those countries alone responsible for our statistically
significant coefficients? We check that by dropping all previously socialist states
from our regressions. We find that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on our
FTA variable is actually somewhat higher in the restricted sample. This probably
reflects the fact that some socialist countries that became democracies later reverted
to autocracies, despite effective participation in FTAs (e.g., Azerbaijan).
A related concern is that some trade agreements contain rules specifying
that members must be democratic. This was a precondition for accession of the
Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union. Mercosur added
a similar clause for all of its members in 1998. For those countries, democracy
and FTA participation must therefore be linked and this may have an important effect on our estimations. Again, we find that the results are very similar
to those from Table 2 when we drop the observations to which such rules apply
(i.e., Central and Eastern European countries once they entered the EU and all
Mercosur members since 1998).
Our democracy consolidation result could arise also because less rent-seeking
democracies may be more likely to sign FTAs and may also last longer, relative to
more rent-seeking democracies. This would imply that the results were driven by
omission of a measure on how rent-seeking a country is. A measure for this variable is generally very hard to find, but Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga (2009)
provide estimates for how much governments care about general welfare relative to
special interests for 54 countries/regions. Although the subset of countries is small
relative to our sample, it provides a useful proxy. Including such a measure (1/b)
in our enddemo regressions, we find that this variable is always highly insignificant,
whereas the FTA_impsh variable remains significant in all regressions despite the
sharp reduction in our sample.
Another possible omitted variable that may be correlated with our measure of
FTA intensity is the country’s relative abundance of national resources. Ownership
of natural resources in resource-rich countries tend to be concentrated in the hands
of cohesive and politically strong oligarchs who benefit from international trade
(and possibly also from participation in FTAs). But abundance in natural resources
is also associated with higher rents and thus with the breakdown of democratic
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regimes (see e.g., Wantchekon 2002). This suggests a potentially positive bias in
our enddemo regression, so not including a measure of resource abundance may artificially dampen our estimates. We confirm this presumption when we add, in turn,
a measure of resource abundance constructed by Albornoz, Galiani, and Heymann
(2012) and the share of ores and metal in a country’s exports.
We also perform a number of robustness checks in our structural regressions.38
First, does the hazard of democratic failure actually predict the formation of new
FTAs, or just the deepening of existing FTAs? To eliminate variation in the dependent variable that is unrelated to the formation of new FTA/PTA links, we repeat the
regressions in Table 8 using the measure of FTA and PTA participation that considers 1960 import shares instead of lagged ones. The estimated coefficient on the hazard falls but remains statistically significant at the 1 percent or the 5 percent level,
confirming that democratic instability indeed helps to predict the formation of new
FTAs (but not of new PTAs), as a more direct interpretation of our model suggests.
Second, is it really the expectation of regime change (proxied by the predicted
hazard) that induces more FTAs? One alternative is that a recent change in regime,
from autocracy to democracy, is what causes more FTAs. Another is that volatility in the degree of democracy has an effect on its own. Our estimated hazard
may be correlated with both recent changes in political regime and the volatility
of democracy. To test whether it is indeed the expectation of regime change that
matters, we include in the ΔFTA regression, in addition to the predicted hazard,
one of the following variables: (i) reg_change, a dummy indicating whether a
country’s polity2 increased from a nonpositive to a strictly positive score, lagged
by one year; and (ii) var(Polity)_10yr, the variance of polity2 scores during the
last ten years, which is used to capture recent regime instability. The first newly
added variable is statistically significant but not the second. Most importantly, the
estimated coefficient on the hazard remains positive and statistically significant.
These results corroborate the idea that the expectation of a possible of democratic
disruption matters for FTA formation.
Third, it is conceivable that our empirical results may be identifying a more general phenomenon than the model suggests. For example, governments may form
more FTAs as a consequence of general political competition within an electoral
system, and not specifically because of the threat from autocrats. If the risk of democratic collapse is positively associated with more political competition within a
democracy, our finding that the threat of the democratic system induces FTA formation may be driven by regular political competition within a democracy. To test
for that, we include a measure of political competition in the ΔFTA regression.
We use the variable POLCOMP from Polity IV, which codes the degree of political competition in the country.39 Again, the newly added variable is statistically
38
Because the squared term of the predicted hazard is insignificant at the 10 percent level in our main regressions (Table 8), we include only the level of the hazard in our robustness checks.
39
This variable measures both the regulation of participation and the competitiveness in the political process.
According to the Polity IV Dataset User’s Manual, POLCOMP reaches its maximum score when “relatively stable
and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion;
ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups; and no significant
groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.”
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insignificant, while the predicted hazard remains statistically significant. This suggests that regular political competition in a country is not an important driver of FTA
formation, unlike the expectation of democratic disruption.
Fourth, negotiating and implementing an FTA is a process that can take several
years. This suggests that the relationship may be stronger if we use longer lags for
the explanatory variables and longer differences for ΔFTA. We do that by running
the five-year difference in FTA_impsh on the same explanatory variables lagged
by five years. Alternatively, we calculate first the 5-year moving averages of the
variables, before taking their five-year lags or five-year differences. Please refer
to the notes in the Appendix table for more details. When we take this longer time
perspective, the estimated coefficient of the hazard remains significant and becomes
considerably larger, as expected.
Finally, as mentioned in Section IV, equation (19) is a standard dynamic panel
data model. Although this implies that our coefficients in Table 8 are estimated with
a bias, the analysis of Judson and Owen (1999), among others, implies that the bias
in our estimates should be relatively small given that our panel is very long. Still, it
is worth investigating the robustness of our results to a formal dynamic panel estimation. We report the results from four specifications analogous to those in Table 8,
but where we use the two-step system GMM method, treating both the lagged
FTA/PTA variables and the estimated hazard terms as endogenous. All specifications pass the autocorrelation and the overidentification tests. We find that the
estimated coefficients of the key hazard terms are qualitatively equivalent to those
obtained from our main specification.
Put together, these robustness checks boost confidence that we are capturing our
intended mechanism, rather than the workings of some omitted variable that affects
both FTA formation and political regimes in general.
VI. Conclusion

We study the relationship between a country’s participation in free trade agreements and the sustainability of its democracy. We develop a model centered on the
destruction of rents caused by FTAs. The model delivers two main results. First,
deeper engagement in FTAs increases the longevity of democracies. Second, political instability promotes FTA participation.
Relying on the concept of democratic capital developed by Persson and Tabellini
(2009) to estimate countries’ hazards out of democracy, we test and confirm our two
main predictions in a sample of 116 countries over almost 50 years. Our results suggest that the rent destruction forces of FTAs constitute an important channel through
which our predictions manifest. Our measure of FTA intensity is aimed at capturing
those forces. Moreover, the predictions hold for “proper,” GATT 1947-compatible
free trade areas and customs unions, but not for partial-scope agreements based on
GATT’s Enabling Clause. We also find that the impact of FTAs on democracy survival is not greater when the partners are more democratic, so it is not simply that
some countries demand democracy from their FTA partners. It is not that general
political competition induces FTA formation either; it is the uncertainty related to
the possibility of major changes in the political regime that matters.
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While all this is “good news” for democratic countries involved in FTAs, we must
emphasize that participation in FTAs is, unsurprisingly, no panacea. They can help
to consolidate democracies, but their reach is limited. Our estimates make this limit
clear. The effect is nevertheless comparable to that of some of the main forces highlighted in the literature, such as the spread and strength of democracies in neighboring countries. Similarly, although we have found that democratic instability compels
governments to engage in FTAs, there are as well many reasons other than democratic instability that also foster participation in FTAs.
Our study pushes forward a small but growing literature (largely in political science) that seeks to uncover links between democracy and FTA participation. We
depart from it by focusing on a specific mechanism—the destruction of rents in
FTAs—that allows us to be more precise about the relationship. The paper also
provides a clear departure from the perspective often taken by economists studying
regionalism, who tend to focus on the strictly economic aspects of its causes and
consequences.40 Purely economic motives certainly help, but cannot fully explain
the intensity of the ongoing outbreak of free trade agreements, which have become
the main trade policy instrument in many countries.41 We show that the instability of
democracies is another important contributing factor to this trend. Yet much remains
to be known about the interplay between trade agreements and democracy. We look
forward to future research to further illuminate this relationship.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We need to show first that Γ  DΔFincreases with ρ. Using (15), we have that

[

]

d Γ  DΔF
PR  ΔF
(A1)	 _
 b) − W  M
 b = 0) −  _
   .
   = δW  M
ΔF(
ΔF(
2
dρ

We know from Lemma 1 that PR  ΔF  < 0 and that the welfare impact of
an FTA is increasing in the rent-seeking bias of the government, so that
(b) − W  M
 b = 0) > 0. Accordingly, expression (A1) is unambiguously
W  M
ΔF
ΔF(
positive, so Γ
   DΔF increases as the probability of disruption rises. As a result, an
FTA that is politically unfeasible when there is no chance of political disruption
can become viable if the likelihood of political disruption is high enough. That
is, an FTA that does not satisfy condition (15) can satisfy criterion (14) for sufficiently high ρ.
To see how I Maffects this result, it suffices to show that the probability of disruption, ρ, is a strategic complement of I Min the function Γ  DΔF. Using the definition of
A notable exception is the recent study by Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2012), who use the frequency of
wars between two countries in the distant past to test whether FTAs lower the probability of war between them.
They find that they do, especially when the trade gains associated with the FTA are high, indicating an interesting
complementarity effect between trade and security gains from FTAs.
41
A figure in the online Appendix illustrates this trend. Indisputably, the number of free trade agreements in
force has accelerated dramatically since the early 1990s. In the same figure we also show the cumulative number
of transitions to democracy and transitions to autocracy throughout the world since 1948. The former trend has
also intensified since the 1990s, but the opposite has happened with the latter, in line with what our results suggest.
40
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welfare aggregated across all nonnuméraire import sectors included in the agreement,
 b) − W  M
 b = 0) = IM[ W  mΔF( b) − W  mΔF( b = 0) ]. Similarly,
we have that W
   M
ΔF(
ΔF(
 ( PR  mΔF ).
the FTA affects political rents only in the included sectors: PRΔF = IM
Therefore, it follows that

[

]
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ΔF
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2
dρdIM
Hence, the set of parameters under which the possibility of political disruption
makes an FTA viable enlarges as I Mincreases.
On the other hand, the reverse cannot happen. If an FTA is politically viable when
there is no chance of political disruption, it remains viable if a possibility of change
in power through force arises. That is, an FTA that satisfies condition (15) also satisfies criterion (14) for any ρ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
In the absence of trade agreements, the authoritarian group attempts to take
power through a coup if condition (11) is satisfied. With an FTA, a similar condition
applies:
1 − ρ(DC)
PR  F 
  
 >  _
   K.
[ W  MF  (b = 0) − W  MF  (b) ] +  _
(A2)	
2
ρ(DC)

The difference between conditions (11) and (A2) is in the expressions’ left-hand
sides, which denote the gains of the authoritarian group from getting power. On the
other hand, the FTA impacts neither the probability of success of a coup nor the
costs of a failed coup attempt. Subtracting the left-hand side of inequality (11) from
the left-hand side of inequality (A2), we obtain
PR  ΔF
 
< 0,
[ W  MΔF(b = 0) − W  MΔF(b) ] +  _
(A3)	
2

where the negative sign follows directly from Lemma 1. Thus, if condition (11) is
not satisfied, condition (16) will not be satisfied either, implying that an FTA cannot
provoke a coup that otherwise would not occur. Conversely, condition (11) can be
satisfied while condition (16) is not, implying that an FTA can be critical to prevent
the authoritarian group from seeking power. Finally, note that the left-hand side of
(A3) decreases with IM:
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Thus, the range of parameters under which an FTA is pivotal in preventing the
authoritarian threat is larger, the greater the number of nonnuméraire import-competing sectors the FTA includes.
Proposition 3: An FTA can become politically feasible by being pivotal to prevent a coup.
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Proof:
When an FTA cannot prevent the authoritarian group from seeking power through
force, it is politically viable if Γ  DΔF= G  ΔF  + δ[(1 − ρ)G  ΔF  + ρH  ΔF  ] > 0. When
the agreement reverses the decision of the authoritarian group, it is adopted by the
democratic government if
 	G  F   + δG  F   > G  + δ[(1 − ρ)G + ρH ],
where the left-hand side represents the present value of the government under the
agreement (and no authoritarian threat) and the right-hand side corresponds to its
expected present value without the FTA (and with the authoritarian threat). This
condition can be rewritten as
(A4)

(1 + δ)G  ΔF  + δρ(G − H) > 0.

   F  > H  F   ,which
Now notice that the left-hand side of (A4) is greater than Γ
   DΔFif G
   F   , which are analogous to those in (6) and
is true from the definitions of G
   F and H
(7). Hence, even if Γ  DΔF< 0, condition (A4) can be satisfied.
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